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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm (South
Africa) and Wilson Harris’s Palace of the Peacock (Guyana) can be read as parodic,
postcolonial rewritings of the biblical creation story in the first chapter o f Genesis.
The Introduction briefly defines the term "postcolonial" as it is used in the thesis.
Part One introduces Schreiner and gives some biographical/textual background that
prepares the ground for an examination of the novel in a postcolonial context. Then, by
way o f preface to the argument about Story, the thesis looks at how another, more
obviously postcolonial author, Harris, revises the Genesis account in his Palace.
Part Two focuses entirely on Story, with a careful look at the "Times and
Seasons" chapter, a peculiar bridge between the novel’s two parts that can be read as
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegorization of the Genesis One account o f creation, an account
that is founded upon a system of binary oppositions (e.g. light/dark). I argue that her
revision (or parody) departs structurally from the Genesis model in two ways: first,
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegory only loosely follows the order of the biblical narrative,
eventually abandoning the Genesis order altogether and assuming an "order" o f its own;
and second, pervading Schreiner’s allegory is a dichotomy—divine justice versus mercy—
that is nowhere present in the biblical creation account, but is raised only in later chapters
o f Genesis. Schreiner’s "beginning," then, is contaminated by ideas that are not really a
part o f the biblical beginning; this reordering and confusion of the biblical text
exemplifies the novel’s postcolonial condition.
After this close examination of Schreiner’s parody of the first chapter o f Genesis,
the thesis concludes with a very brief look at both Schreiner’s and Harris’s endings,
noting how the late-nineteenth century novelist remains ensconced within the framework
of binary oppositions from which she is trying to wrest herself free, while Harris comes
closer to achieving what we might call a postmodern movement out of the inherent
dichotomies of language.

POSTCOLONIAL PARODIES OF THE CREATION STORY
IN OLIVE SCHREINER AND WILSON HARRIS

“He saw the blind dream of creation crumble as it was re-enacted.”

Wilson Harris, Palace o f the Peacock

INTRODUCTION: “THE POST-COLONIAL IS DEAD; LONG LIVE
POSTCOLONIALISM”

In 1989, three Australian writers—Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen
Tiffin—published The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial
Literatures, the first (and ten years later still very much a standard) introduction to the
burgeoning field of post-colonial studies. In a 1991 critique o f this book, Vijay Mishra
and Bob Hodge begin with a question that inevitably lies at the root o f any scholarly
discussion regarding post-colonial discourse (and which thus also lies at the root of the
present study): namely, "What is post(-)colonialism?" Historically speaking, they note,
the term emerged as a replacement for "Commonwealth Literature," a concept that came
to be seen as ambiguous and ideologically loaded both because it subtly reinscribed a
distinction between the center (Britain) and its margins (the Commonwealth) and because
it implied a false unity between the former imperial power and its colonies. By contrast,
the replacement term foregrounded the political/cultural struggles between center and
periphery, and abetted the "destabilization o f the barriers around 'English Literature' that
protected the primacy of the canon and the self-evidence of its standards" (Hodge 399).
However, since its advent, the term "post-colonial" has created more confusion
than it has resolved. In recent years an increasing number o f critics have started both to
expose and collapse the assumptions inherent within the term “post-colonial” in
2
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whichever of its many contexts it is used (e.g., describing certain societies and their
histories; categorizing the literatures these societies have produced; or designating an
entire academic discourse)1. In each such context, questions of the following sort
resonate deeply: “When was ‘the post-colonial?’” (Hall 242). What literatures can fall
under its rubric? Does its ostensibly definitive periodisation (past colonization) refer to a
chronological break in two histories, or to a rupture between two ways of understanding
those histories; in other words, is the “post-colonial” an historical or an epistemological
term? Is it both?
Perhaps the best place to start is with a reiteration of the problematic binaries that
are implicit in the term “post-colonial.” The mere presence of the hyphen would seem to
indicate a simple division between the purely “colonial” and the purely “post” (or past,
both temporally and ideologically) colonial. Historically, a country would be colonial
only as long as it was occupied by the colonizer, and would become post-colonial after
the demise o f imperial rule. Transposing this logic to the literary realm, a “colonial” text
would be one produced during colonial rule, would attempt to repeat the center on the
periphery, and would not intend any revision of the central tenets o f colonial power (e.g.
white supremacy, Christianity, etc.). A “post-colonial” text, then, would be one written
after colonial occupation and would consciously and intentionally revise and/or reject the
literary and ideological traditions o f the imperial center. Viewed in this way, the
movement from the colonial to the post-colonial would be linear and chronological—a
definitive moment in history, with the spaces on either side marked accordingly.
However, as critics like Hodge and Mishra, Ella Shohat, Stuart Hall, and others

have almost unanimously pointed out, this type of binary logic is easily deconstructed, as
neither the wholly “colonial” nor the wholly “post-colonial” text can in fact exist, in the
same way that neither the wholly colonial nor the wholly post-colonial culture can exist.
Because the very act of colonization involves the superimposition o f one (imperial)
culture upon another (indigenous) culture, a colonial society will always be a mix of the
two, a hybridized culture in which the interplay of (often conflicting) ideologies, customs,
and peoples comes to define the society at large. Likewise, a society that has experienced
colonialism and its aftermath will never be able fully to return to its pre-colonial
condition, as the colonial experience leaves its indelible marks (such as racial
intermixture, religious ideologies, and memories of slavery) on virtually every aspect of
the culture, including its literatures. The post-colonial text (one produced after the
official departure of the colonial power) will thus inevitably contain elements o f the
colonial (even as it strives to wrest its freedom from that influence); moreover, the
colonial work will always already be “post” colonial as it (either consciously or
unconsciously) wrestles through, and from within, the conflicting cultural biases
constitutive o f colonial societies. Any attempt, therefore, to take a “then and now,” “us
and them” approach to classing or examining a society and its literary works as “postcolonial” is an exercise in futility. One could, in effect, say that the post-colonial was
dead on arrival.
Faced with this situation, what are critics to do? Are we to throw up our hands in
the face o f an experience and a discourse that resists any kind of black and white
absolutism? Certainly not. If poststructuralism has taught us anything, it is how to wield
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our scholarly swords among toppling signiflers and signifieds; how to neither collapse
our opposing categories nor posit any unqualified distinction between them. If we are to
confront post-colonial discourse, then, it must be with a'sensitivity to the ambivalent
territories opened up by poststructuralism, as Hodge and Mishra contend. They propose a
middle ground between the two (impossible) extremes of the colonial and post-colonial:
namely, the postcolonial (no hyphen), an “always present tendency in any literature o f
subjugation marked by a systematic process of cultural domination through the
imposition of imperial structures of power . . . [, a] form of ‘postcolonialism’ [that] is not
‘post-’ something or other but is already implicit in the discourses of colonialism
themselves” (407). This “complicit postcolonialism” differs from the hyphenated version
in that it is an ideological orientation rather than an historical stage, an epistemology
rather than a chronology. It does not attempt to set up a “then” and “now,” “home” and
“abroad” perspective, but acknowledges the interdependent, symbiotic relationship
between colonizer and colonized (unlike the more polemical, if equally ideological,
perspective o f what they call “oppositional post-colonialism”). As Hall points out,
colonization “was never simply external to the societies o f the imperial metropolis. It
was always inscribed deeply within them as it became indelibly inscribed in the cultures
o f the colonized” (Hall 246). As Mishra and Hall put it, “the post-colonial is dead; long
live postcolonialism” (413).
Given this shift away from the post-colonial as a “movement of linear
transcendence between two mutually exclusive states” toward the postcolonial as an
inclusive epistemological concept in which center and periphery, before and after, can
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only be understood as they relate to one another, a host of works that would otherwise
have fallen outside the frame of the post-colonial (e.g., works written by white settlers in
the colonies, or works written by indigenous authors during the period of colonial
occupation) can now be examined under the postcolonial rubric. Olive Schreiner’s The
Story o f an African Farm (1883—henceforth Story) is one such work. As I will be
arguing, Schreiner’s Story (which until recently would have been classed only as a
“colonial” work, given the South African Schreiner’s European [English and German]
ancestry and the century in which she wrote) can be read as an almost quintessentially
postcolonial text in its repetition and attempted revision of the colonizer’s (Europe’s)
story o f origin— specifically, the Genesis (Chapter One) account o f creation in the Bible2.
Part One of this thesis will first introduce Schreiner and give some
biographical/textual background for an examination o f the novel in a postcolonial
context. Then, by way o f preface to my argument about Story. I will be looking at how
another, more obviously postcolonial author, Guyana’s Wilson Harris, similarly revises
the Genesis creation account in his Palace of the Peacock (1960); this comparison will
foreground some o f the ways in which Harris and Schreiner differ in their attempts at
“writing out o f ’ the stories of Empire (and in their degree o f “success” at achieving this).
Part Two will focus entirely on Story, with a careful examination o f the “Times and
Seasons” chapter, a peculiar bridge between the novel’s two parts that can be read as
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegorization of the Genesis One account o f creation. I will
argue that her revision departs structurally from the Genesis model in two ways: 1)
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegory, while clearly evoking the seven-day creation narrative
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in Genesis One, only loosely follows the order o f that biblical narrative, eventually
abandoning the Genesis One order altogether and assuming an “order” o f its own (e.g.,
the biblical seventh day of rest is displaced to day 5; days 6 and 7 are conflated); and 2)
pervading Schreiner’s allegory is a dichotomy-divine justice versus mercy—that is
nowhere present in the Bible’s Genesis One, but is raised only in later chapters of Genesis
(beginning in Chapter 3).
Schreiner’s “beginning,” then, is contaminated by ideas that are not really a part
o f the biblical beginning; her presentation of the creation story is disorderly not only in its
“re-ordering” of the creation narrative’s events, but also in its inclusion o f biblical
elements that do not “rightly” belong in Genesis One, but come after it. These two
structural “failures” evidence the above point that there is always-already an element of
the postcolonial implicit in the colonial text; that colonial texts might well wish faithfully
to mimic their “central” models, but o f necessity fail in this effort (disordering the
original story, getting it mixed up with other stories). Schreiner’s Story is more complex
in that, while it indeed attempts to mimic the central model, it also reveals itself as being
uneasy with that model, distorting it in an unfaithful manner that will come to be
associated with texts from the historically post-colonial period (around 1950 and after).
After looking closely at Schreiner’s (un)faithful rendition o f the first chapter of
Genesis, the thesis will conclude with a very brief look at both Schreiner’s and Harris’s
endings, noting how the late-nineteenth-century novelist remains ensconced within the
framework of binary oppositions from which she is trying to wrest herself free, while
Harris comes closer to achieving what we might call a postmodern movement out of the
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inherent dichotomies of language and into a future that could well set the stage for the
actual passage, at least within literature, into a truly /705?-colonial space.

PART ONE: “THE VEIL OF CREATION”

The ancient Chaldean seer had a vision of a Garden of Eden which lay in a
remote p a s t. . . We also have our dream of a Garden, but it lies in a distant future.
Olive Schreiner. Woman and Labour

Seven days it had taken to finish the original veil of creation that shaped
and ordered all things to be solid in the beginning. So the oldest fable ran. Perhaps
seven, too, were needed to strip and subtilize everything.
Wilson Harris, The Secret Ladder

When in 1911 the South African writer Olive Schreiner envisioned the future of
women's struggle for equality, she cast her depiction in biblical terms, describing the
collective "dream o f a Garden" as a boat full o f "women with oars, rowing hard against
the stream, the horizon they aim to reach veiled in mists, but convinced that what they see
dimly ahead is not a delusion . . . [but] a new Garden of Eden" (quoted in Berkman 158).
Such imaginative re-visionings o f the past— specifically the Judeo-Christian past as
recounted in the opening chapters of Genesis— occur time and again in Schreiner's work.
9
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Take, for example, her reversal of the account of woman as man's “help meet” (Genesis
2:18;20)3 in “Three Dreams in a Desert”: “And I said, ‘Surely he who stands beside her
will help her?’ And he beside me answered, ‘He cannot help her: she must help herself.
Let her struggle till she is strong’” [Dreams 59). Again, in Thoughts on South Africa
Schreiner uses the image of the tree of life (Genesis 3:22) "under whose protecting
shadow endless forms o f life may spring up and flourish" [Thoughts 355) to describe
what she in her early years saw as the nurturing role o f imperial England, recasting the
image as a "tree of death" (a "colossal upas-tree" under whose poisonous branches
"plants, flowers, and animals suffocated" [333]) when she later became critical o f
colonial rule4. Finally, in the example that will occupy us here—The Story of an African
Farm—Schreiner delineates the seven stages in the creation and development o f the
individual psyche, an account that, I will argue, both loosely mimics and substantially
revises the seven days o f creation as presented in the opening chapter of Genesis.
That Schreiner should be thus concerned with mimicking and rewriting traditional
biblical tropology can be attributed in part to her childhood rearing in and rejection of the
Christian faith. Finding it nearly impossible to accept the religious precepts o f her
missionary parents (who preached the inferiority of women to men, the sinfulness o f the
body, and the racial and ethnic superiority of white Britons to all other races), Schreiner
early counted herself among the damned (Berkman 17)5. Not only did she rebel against
her parents' teachings, but, at the young age of five, she was unable to reconcile her
certainty regarding a pervasive cosmic integration (her sense that there was a "unity o f all
things, that they were alive, and that I was a part of them" [Cronwright-Schreiner, Life
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218]) with the Calvinist emphases on God’s sovereignty, dualism of body and soul, and
man's depravity versus God's perfection. The stage was thus set for her total rejection of
the Christian faith at the age o f nine, when, after her younger sister Ellie's death, she
could no longer "accept the ordinary doctrine that [one who died] was living somewhere
without a body" (219). In later years Schreiner denied the divinity o f Christ (pejoratively
referring to "Christianity, with its horrible doctrine of man as God!" [CronwrightSchreiner, Letters 307]) and reconceived God-the-Father as a genderless spiritual entity
fDreams 156).
Despite this complete disavowal of belief in anything that could be deemed
"traditional" Christianity, the Bible itself continued to play an important role in
Schreiner's literary works. As scholars almost unfailingly point out, her novels are
"steeped in biblical syntax" (Berkman 229) and ring with the "sonorous phrases o f the
Old Testament and the striking simplicity o f the gospels" (Haynes 76-77) even as they
contest and revise the central tenets of both Testaments. Certainly Schreiner's religious
upbringing and subsequent repudiation of the Christian faith (a familiar Victorian
trajectory) can begin to account for this simultaneous repetition and revision. However,
this biographical information does not account for Schreiner's particular attention to
revising the Genesis text. While the Genesis One account, according to traditional
interpretation, is concerned with the production o f order out o f chaos by the divine
establishment of various polarizations (for example, heaven/earth, light/dark, day/night,
and man/animal), Schreiner’s revision of Genesis One, as mentioned earlier, is more
concerned with revising a polarization that is not established until Genesis Three: God’s

holiness versus human depravity, God’s wrath versus his love. Indeed, as the seven
days/stages in the soul’s development progress, it becomes evident that Schreiner’s text
ultimately aims not just to revise these particular oppositional ideas (even as it
accomplishes that revision structurally in the two ways outlined earlier), but to escape the
very notion o f binary opposition itself.
Schreiner’s use of the Genesis framework to contest the notion o f binary
opposition, as I will argue in more detail in Part Two of this thesis, is best understood
within a postcolonial framework. To understand why, one must first understand the
centrality o f the Bible, and Judeo-Christian ideology itself, to the colonial enterprise.
First, on a large scale, one o f the pursuits o f the imperial center was to “Christianize the
heathen.” The idea that the West would be the harbinger of salvation to the “rest” served
as the major justification for many o f the atrocities o f slavery and racial subjugation in the
colonies (what Derek Walcott has called the “conversion of the tribe” [“Muse o f
History”]). Thus evangelization itself was one cause of polarization within the
colonies-the saved versus the unsaved, Christians versus heathens. Secondly, on a
smaller scale, the Genesis account proved significant in and o f itself, as the Empire (like
the God of the Old Testament who creates a utopic Garden of Eden) tried to “play God”
and create new Edens of its own within the settler colonies. And, just as the Genesis
account is predicated upon a system of diametric oppositions (e.g., light versus dark
[“And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness”
(1:4)]; day versus night [“And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the
heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and
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for days, and years” (1:14)]; man versus animal [“And God said, Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion . . . over all the earth” (1:26)]), so
too is the imperial attempt to create a colony based on a system of underlying
oppositions: racial/ethnic (black versus white); theological (heathen versus Christian);
cultural (indigenous versus settler); and political (colony versus metropole). Therefore, if
one is going to revise the notion of opposition from within a colonial setting, one had best
start by “writing out o f ’ the originating Genesis text.
Before continuing, it must be noted that I do not mean to suggest that the literary
revisioning of the seven-day Genesis creation story is a uniquely postcolonial endeavor.
Indeed, literary works always consist, to a lesser or greater extent, of the works that have
gone before. Perhaps no other text has been subject to this kind o f intertextual re-vision
than the Bible itself, especially the creation account in Genesis One6. However, what I do
want to suggest is that, whereas an author like Milton is writing from within a particular
well-established tradition (that we now identify as the English literary canon), in
postcolonial writing this tradition is appropriated and re-visioned from the relatively
uncharted margins of that tradition, at least one remove (i.e., geographically) from the
center. Thus, postcolonial texts such as Schreiner’s might seem to be written simply from
the “center” of the European literary tradition (a tradition in which rewritings of biblical
stories are ubiquitous); yet they are not quite the same as the tradition's, as Schreiner is
forced to grapple with a different set o f questions than did writers like Milton or Blake,
since she has to confront the “alien” nature of that tradition on African soil. Thus
Schreiner’s imitation of Genesis is at an immediate “disadvantage,” its project o f mimetic

re-vision seemingly doomed to failure. As mentioned in the Introduction, this “failure”
manifests itself in the “Times and Seasons” chapter in two ways: in the tenuousness of
any one-to-one adherence to the Genesis One model; and in the contaminatory presence
o f a dichotomy—justice versus mercy—that is nowhere present in the first chapter of
Genesis itself.
However, this “failure” need not be cast in a negative light (as it most likely
would have been in Schreiner’s Victorian era, as discussed below), but can be looked
upon positively as a move away from the “colonial” model, a movement through (and
beyond) the original text. This is precisely what Schreiner—subtly, and perhaps even
unintentionally—assays in the “Times and Seasons” chapter (note the echoes in her
chapter title of the biblical passage cited above, where day and night serve as “signs to
mark seasons and days and years”), which attempts to deconstruct binaries like the
justice/mercy dichotomy via her (albeit imperfect) mimicry of the Genesis creation story.
This idea of mimicry was an important one in Schreiner’s Victorian (pre-modernist) era,
during which time the “ideal o f mimetic representation” was upheld as the central feature
of “great” literature (Monsman 48). Thus, a “great” work would strive both to re-present
a “real” England, and to imitate the works that had come before (Austen, Dickens, Eliot,
etc.). In the former respect Schreiner was at an immediate disadvantage, as she was
confined to the colony (she was nearly thirty when she first left South Africa), and was
denied access to the kind o f experiences privileged by the center, those experiences with
which "literature" was supposedly concerned. Thus Schreiner, to cite The Empire Writes
Back’s discussion o f the unique predicament o f the colonial author, was "consigned to a
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world o f mimicry and imitation, since [she was] forced to write about material which lies
at one remove from the significant experiences o f the post-colonial world" (Ashcroft 88)7.
Schreiner's first novel, Undine (published after Story), is one such "failed" colonial
attempt to write a traditional Victorian novel: set in an England she had never seen, at
“one remove” (at least!) from her significant experiences, Undine is in large part a
pastiche that "unfortunately . . . echoes a host of nineteenth-century novels, from those of
George Eliot to the then-popular works of Elizabeth Gaskell and Margaret Oliphant"
(Monsman 38). While Story was, for the most part, well-received in its own day (see
First and Scott 120-124), much of its negative appraisal in the 1960s and ‘70s was
likewise based on the assumption that the work is an imperfect imitation o f the traditional
Victorian novel, failing to adhere to such nineteenth-century conventions as linear
narrative and realistic character portrayal, and jumbling together several narrative modes
in a style that Joyce Avrech Berkman, in a reappraisal of Schreiner's technique, has called
an "aesthetics of literary miscegenation" (Berkman 195).8
Yet it is precisely this "failed" mimicry that renders the novel both artistically and
theoretically significant, for it points to Schreiner's uniquely postcolonial situation: that
is, the textual failure to create a novel that mimics the "stories" of Empire bespeaks the
very failure of Empire to create a colony capable of mimicking the culture o f the
metropolitan center9. It is here, when we read Schreiner's unsuccessful textual mimicry as
a literary re-enactment o f the failures o f the colonial enterprise, that the biblical creation
account becomes central. J. M. Goetzee notes that the original colonization of South
Africa was an abortive attempt to create a new Garden of Eden in the Cape, to "hold the
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colony to what it had originally been planned as: a trading post, a garden . . . Why did
[this] garden myth, the myth of a return to Eden and innocence, fail to take root in the
garden colony of the Cape?” (Coetzee 1-2). Coetzee's answer is straightforward enough:
"The simplest answer to the question is that Africa could never, in the European
imagination, be the home o f the earthly paradise because Africa was not a new w orld '
(2— my italics). In other words, the colonizer's attempt to inscribe the biblical story upon
the indigenous culture is always-already positioned for failure, as the European text can
never fully replace the existing cultural "text," but will merely be superimposed over it in
palimpsest fashion10. Thus the biblical creation story— indeed, any imperial "story"— can
only be "misread" by those living in the colony, be they colonizer or colonized.
Schreiner's mimicry of the seven-day creation story in Story, then, is one such inevitable
"misreading" o f the originary biblical text, the effect of which is parodic. In using the
term "parody" to describe Schreiner’s revision o f the creation story I am adopting Linda
Hutcheon's insightful definition of parody (in her Theory o f Parody [1985]) as "not just
that ridiculing imitation mentioned in the standard dictionary definitions . . . but imitation
characterized by ironic inversion . .. Parody is, in another formulation, repetition with
critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity" (Hutcheon 5-6)11.
Hutcheon points out that parody often functions as a means o f coming to terms with the
past "through ironic recoding" and that parody's "historical consciousness" (that is, its
self-conscious acknowledgement that it is both referring back to and recoding a prior text)
gives it the "potential power to both bury the dead, so to speak, and also to give it new
life" (101). In subsequent articles and books, Hutcheon (herself the product o f a settler
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colony, Canada) would go on to develop this point in the specific context of the
postcolonial author, whose parodies of Western texts will always, in one way or another,
function as cleansing— and yet inevitably compromised-—attempts to "write out o f'
imperial textual/ideological authority. In this sense, Schreiner's parodic revision o f the
creation story is simultaneously a journey into the colonial past (via her mimicry o f the
biblical text, the "vision of the ancient Chaldean") and a movement toward the postcolonial future (via her misreading of that vision in an attempt to re-create an Eden that
"lies in a distant future").12
Whether or not Schreiner's story—The Story o f an African Farm— accomplishes
this movement out o f the biblical/colonial stories of the past and into a textual future free
o f the oppositional structures imposed by texts like the Genesis narrative is the driving
question in my examination of the novel. While I have mentioned some of the
oppositions laid out in the first and third chapters o f Genesis (both of which occupy
“Times and Seasons”), perhaps the most obvious "oppositional structure" in the Christian
Bible is its own bipartite division into the Old and New Testaments, a division that the
two-part structure of Story apparently mimics. Yet this surface reading is too simple, for
Part One— as we will see— details the contamination and failure of both Old and New
Testament teachings, ultimately displaying the breakdown of the bipartite biblical
structure itself. This breakdown is further amplified by the "Times and Seasons" chapter,
a curious bridge between the two parts that functions as Schreiner's sevenfold attempt to
"re-create" a religious paradigm that has already broken down in Part One. The seven
stages in the soul's development outlined in that chapter are loosely parallel to the
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Genesis account o f the seven days of creation. However, as I will detail farther in Part
Two, while the creation story is clearly evoked, the further into the chapter we read the
more evident it becomes that the one-to-one structural correspondence is barely readable.
Rather, the creation story becomes for Schreiner a mere framing device within which she
attempts to eradicate/reconcile the various binary oppositions she reads as posited by the
Bible (e.g., a just [Old Testament] versus a loving [New Testament] God; human versus
animal). And, as both the later stages in the soul’s development and the second half of
the novel reveal, Schreiner is unsuccessful in this attempt. Her inability to work with the
pre-existing structures o f the Bible (i.e, the Old/New Testament structure and the Genesis
One story) lead to her very imprisonment by those structures: justice and mercy, black
and white, human and animal remain in diametric opposition to one another. Indeed, the
second half o f the novel resounds with religious disillusionment and racist overtones.
Schreiner's failure to wrest herself free from the racial stereotypes o f her time
(even as she strove to eliminate sexual stereotypes) was the source o f immense conflict in
her life and writing13. For instance, on the one hand she promoted racial intermixture as
the means to a more egalitarian society, predicting that a racial "choral symphony" would
emerge from continued intermarriage (Berkman 118); on the other, she supported
Darwin's theory o f biological reversion (atavism) in interracial breeding (88), and
continued to use derisive terms like "half-caste" (Schreiner, Thoughts 140), "nigger"
(Diamond Fields 15-16), and "Hottentot" (Thoughts 52). Again, she argued that global
unity would result "not in the extermination o f earth's varied races, or in the dominance of
anyone over a l l . . . but in a free and equal federation o f all" (296-97); however, when
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asked if she was a "negrophile," Schreiner replied:
No—we are trying to be, but we are not y e t . . . It would be a lie to say we loved
the black man . . . [but] we will treat him as if we loved him: and in time . . . we
shall perhaps be able to look deep into each other's eyes and smile: as parent and
child. (361 — my italics)
The simultaneous occupation of two such contradictory positions is basic to Schreiner’s
perspective— an ambivalence that, as I have argued, is at the heart of postcolonialism.
Finally, then, Schreiner's continued reliance on the idea of oppositional structure,
both biographically (even her eventual "love" for the African is conceived in hierarchical
terms) and in her fiction signals the fact that, while she does indeed parody the creation
text and strive to overthrow its system of binary oppositions, she remains ensconced
within the very framework her parody tries to undermine and undo. Thus, the second half
o f Story does not attempt to "re-structure" the world according to a non-oppositional
system, but reflects a world in which the too-rigid (for Schreiner) structures o f the Bible
are present as distant echoes; the patriarchal system of binary oppositions remains present
to the end. Schreiner's failure to escape colonial/Victorian dualisms in Story may have
contributed to the fact that she reached an impasse after its publication and was never able
to complete another novel, spending the remaining years of her life in a state of creative
frustration, summed up in her lament in an 1899 letter to Havelock Ellis: "I am only a
broken and untried possibility" (Cronwright-Schreiner, Letters 227).
Schreiner's "failed" literary attempt to escape imperial/patriarchal dichotomies
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raises an issue important not only to her own colonial era, but to our
postmodem/poststructuralist era as well: how does one move away from the hierarchical
linguistic constructs of the Eurocentric past? After all, if Derrida and his ilk have taught
us anything, it is that the very act of enonciation places the speaker/writer squarely within
the realm of oppositional hierarchy, as language itself is based upon a system of
contraries (i.e., the concept o f "light" would not exist without its counterpart, "dark") that
implicitly privileges one term over another (light over dark, white over black, etc.).
Given this a priori condition, any creative attempt to transform the language so that its
dichotomies become not just inverted but eradicated would seem destined to fail; the task
o f producing a fiction that might somehow purge the biases inherent in language itself
would appear to be an exercise in futility.
Notwithstanding the difficulty o f this enterprise, it is precisely such a task
that Wilson Harris undertakes in his first novel, Palace of the Peacock, which works
insistently toward breaking free from the realm of oppositional structure (indeed, from the
very notion of "structure" itself), "consuming its own biases" (Harris. Womb 26) through
both a radical re-vision of conventional language use and, as Schreiner assayed in Story, a
parodic "misreading" of the Genesis story. In Palace this parody begins with "The Second
Death,"14 the third o f its four books (as in Story, the novel’s halfway point serving as the
point of departure for the story of beginnings), when the plantation owner Donne and his
multiracial river crew commence a seven-day journey upriver into the Guyanese interior
as they pursue the aboriginal "folk" who have fled Donne's harsh rule. Most critics agree
that the "allotted seven" days (Palace 76) allude to the seven-day creation story in
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Genesis* and they almost without exception read the two texts as parallel.15 While this
type o f reading is an important step toward understanding Harris' work in terms o f its
biblical intertext, I would take the argument one step further to contend that, given
Harris's Caribbean context, and his own theoretical/creative project, the seven-day river
journey in Palace can only be read as a reverse parallel movement through the Genesis
account in an attempt (like Schreiner's) to "write out o f' this particular imperial story, to
"strip and subtilize" the "original veil of creation" fSecret Ladder 417) outlined in the
Bible.16 In calling the biblical creation story a "veil" Harris implies that it hides or
obscures what lies behind—here, among other things, the pre-colonial "text" of
indigenous Caribbean culture (a notion similar to the "palimpsest" effect described
above). The seven-day structure o f the last half of Palace functions as the "stripping"
away of this veil, the first day o f the journey being analogous to the seventh "day o f rest"
in the Bible, the second to the sixth, and so forth, continuing until this one-to-one
(reverse) mimicry falls apart on the fifth (third) day, with the final two days o f the voyage
running together with no clear structure as guide. Finally, the crew reaches a primordial,
pre-Edenic state in which the oppositional biases inherent in Genesis (e.g. light/dark,
heavens/earth) have been eroded and replaced by the protean, apocalyptic image of the
"palace o f the peacock" itself (a "symbol o f totality" that "unitefs] the disparate elements
o f creation" [Maes-Jelinek, Naked Design 54]). Thus Harris more nearly approaches a
"re-creation" of his textual universe than does Schreiner, a re-creation that may well mark
the passage from a colonial to a post(-)colonial world.
Why is Harris able so radically to re-vision the biblical creation story while
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Schreiner remains fixed in its inherent system o f oppositions? There are a number of
possible reasons, a few of which it will be helpful to expound upon here before taking a
closer look at The Story of an African Farm. As Schreiner's concern with the creation
story is inextricably linked to her identity as a South African writer living in a racially
divided society o f natives and settlers, so too is Harris's reverse movement through the
Genesis text—the European text of origin-—directly tied to his identity as a Caribbean
writer, for "one o f the most clearly and frequently seen regularities of the Caribbean novel
is its reiteration o f the theme that has come to be known as 'the search for identity' or 'the
search for roots'" (Benitez-Rojo 186). The ubiquitous Caribbean literary quest to recover
origins— origins that will "authorize a beginning" (Bhabha 96)— is catalyzed by the fact
that the original West Indian colonial enterprise was responsible for literally stripping
both the natives and the imported slaves o f their historical identities. Within a century of
their invasion, the European colonizers virtually annihilated the indigenous Caribs and
Arawaks (Ashcroft 26); uprooted Africans from their homeland and shipped them to the
Caribbean as slaves (where oftentimes they were separated from other members o f their
language groups and forced to speak in the language of the plantation owners [27]); and,
in the nineteenth century, imported Indian and Chinese natives to the West Indies as
"indentured labourers," only to leave them stranded in the Caribbean when return clauses
in indenture contracts were not honored (146). Thus deprived o f their cultural origins, the
colonized peoples were to a great extent forced to "[live] in a borrowed culture" (Naipaul
68) and to accept the biblical story o f origin—the creation story— as their own. As
subsequent generations passed, the original identities and tales o f origin of each culture-
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core faded as "black” and "white" races began to mix, creating what has today become an
increasingly "creolized" Caribbean culture—a condition that some West Indian writers
"see as the chaos, others as the open possibilities of their society" (Ramchand 4).
How is creolization— an inevitable result of the injustices o f European
colonization—the source o f "open possibilities" in West Indian society? It is indeed one
o f the great ironies o f Caribbean literature that the confluence of races (cultural
metissage) has become for most Caribbean writers a potential means o f escape from the
imperial authority o f the past, which fomented (and also anathematized) racial
hybridization itself. For creolization by nature involves the erosion o f the dichotomies
(between black and white, master and slave) that the imperial project instituted and
perpetuated. Thus, creolization opens the door to a "new" perception o f the West Indian
situation: as the Barbadian poet and critic Edward Kamau Brathwaite defines it,
creolization is "a way o f seeing [Caribbean] society, not in terms o f white and black,
master and slave, in separate nuclear units, but as contributory parts o f a whole"
(Brathwaite, Development 307). Despite the anti-essentialist vision his concept of
hybridity affords (which more and more postcolonial critics are recognizing as the
"necessary precondition of the future emergence, at the local level, o f healthy Caribbean
societies and, at the global level, of a functional world order" [Bongie 54]), Brathwaite
also proposes that an (ab)original essence exists at the core of each racial group that
remains distinct even when racial groups have mixed. To recover his/her originating
"essence," or "nam," the artist must make a "journey into the past and hinterland which is
at the same time a movement o f possession into present and future" (Brathwaite,
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"Timehri" 42).17
This "journey into the past," which is concomitantly a "movement into the future,"
is in many respects the essence of Harris's fictional project. If "history is a fiction," as
Harris him self states (quoted in Fabre 42), then its "facts" are actually mere
"perceptions"— a recognition that allows the poet/artist to re-vision the Caribbean past,
re-animate the antagonistic images infecting its history, and view them from a radically
different perspective. This is precisely the movement of Palace, as the river crew's
journey into the past (backward through Genesis) carries them to a visionary future free
o f the kinds o f polarizations the biblical Genesis narrative institutes. While critics have
often stressed the incompatibility of Brathwaite's and Harris's approaches to the
quest(ion) o f origins,18 one should not overlook their shared belief that a new age o f
racial/cultural harmony will emerge only through a backward journey that will catalyze
the kind o f breakdown o f oppositions exemplified by creolization. Like Brathwaite,
Harris is primarily concerned with the eradication of oppositions inherent in the colonial
discourses o f the past, seeing "in the very dissolution o f monolithic world structures
(including, of course, the dissolution o f empire) an opportunity for the renascence o f a
more 'balanced' civilization" (Maes-Jelinek, "Unfinished Genesis" 237).
How will this "dissolution" begin? Harris proposes that the union of the disparate
elements in any given dichotomy will effect their eventual "consumption"; however, this
will require the sacrifice o f dualistic cognition, those "embedded and cherished habits of
thought and feeling perpetuated by frozen tradition" (Adler 37-38). In this sense Harris's
vision accords with that of William Blake (to whom he is often compared), who imagined
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that the wedding of contraries would bring about the apocalypse and institute the
millennium, the thousand-year reign o f the kingdom o f God on earth.19 Harris, who uses
a line from a Blake letter as one of Palace’s epigraphs (“It ceases to be history and
becomes [. . .] fabricated for pleasure, as modems say, but I say by Inspiration”), also
feels that we live in what could be a "gateway age," that if the "doors o f perception were
cleansed" (Blake 73)— if people "could read themselves in a different way and read the
world around them in a different way" (Gilkes, "Landscape" 38)—we would move
through the present age to "an era never before conceived o f by man" (Adler 37). Indeed,
Harris holds out as a "dazzling and almost tangible possibility a new creation o f the world
and man by man him self' (40).
At this point, one may well ask how, practically speaking, Harris believes the
world will be thus transformed. Certainly the divine task o f re-creating the universe so
that its defining dichotomies are conjoined and thereby consumed is beyond the scope of
any literary endeavour. Yet Harris believes the artistic imagination is capable o f pre
figuring such a radical change via the production of (what I here term) a "creolized
fiction," which symbiotically combines words and/or ideas that would traditionally be
considered "opposites." As Gilkes points out, "because he refuses to consider concepts
like 'strong' and 'weak,' 'good' and 'evil,' or even 'actual' and 'fictitious' as self-evident
absolutes or diametrically opposed definitions, Harris's universe . . . is composed of
contraries" (Gilkes, Wilson Harris 3). Thus, Harris's fiction abounds with seeming
paradoxes, such as "I awoke with one dead seeing eye and one living closed eye" /Palace
19), "falling motionlessly" (100), and "he saw the invisible otherness around" (108— my
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italics). The narrator of Palace himself concludes that harmony is achieved only through
the commingling of opposites:
I had understood that no living ear on earth can truly understand the fortune of
love and the art of victory over death without mixing blind joy and sadness and
. the sense of being lost with the nearness of being found. (114)
How can one speak of oneself as being both lost and found at one and the same time?
This is the quest(ion) that Harris poses to his reader.
Harris's unique vision— that the eradication of oppositional thinking will result
from the transformation (creolization) of oppositional language— is what ultimately
distinguishes his work and thought from that o f a late-Victorian writer like Schreiner,
who "could formulate no convincing alternatives to the existing colonial order" (Gorak
71), an order based upon binary conceptions. Confronted with this vision, the unwary
reader might be tempted to identify it as that o f a quintessentially "postmodernist" or
"poststructuralist" writer/theoretician—that is, as that of someone whose fictional method
suggests that words are not inseparably linked to their "meanings," thus demonstrating the
"convertibility of language" [Maes-Jelinek, “Forward” 10]). However, Harris, as is only
fitting, resists even this kind o f categorization. For him, the universe o f games to which
art is relegated once signifier and signified are ripped apart is abhorrent:
Art is not a game. It's not the nihilist post-modernist game. I would never go
along with post-modernism because, whatever theoretical value it has, art really
becomes a game. I have no theories in that sense . . . one [can] have a religious
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hope. That may seem a strange assertion, that one could have a religious hope.
(quoted in Riach 59)
It is this religious sense that, ultimately, sets Harris apart from the post-Nietzschean world
o f skeptical thought with which his narratives often seem to overlap.
Attending to this religious sense also provides the final grounds for my reading of
Palace as a parody o f the biblical creation story. Michael Jagessar has brilliantly argued
that "a crucial question for theology in the Caribbean relates to discovering metaphors
and symbols through which God can be conceived as the Thou who is related to the world
in an interdependent way," as opposed to the concept of God as an outsider, over and
above the people. This revision o f the conception of God must commence, Jagessar
continues, with a radical revision o f the language, "a revision which must begin at the
level o f the imagination. Consequently, there is a need to deconstruct and reconstruct the
traditional metaphors and symbols o f the Christian faith" (Jagessar 224). Palace, as I
have suggested, accomplishes this revision by "deconstructing" the Genesis story and
"reconstructing" it through the elimination o f its system of oppositions; the creation
account is exposed as a "blind dream" and thereby "crumbles as it is re-enacted." Couple
this theological position with the fact that Harris's creative project is remarkably similar
to that of Christianity (to literally "establish the Kingdom o f God on earth" through the
creative imagination [Riach 54]), and it indeed seems strange that, as Mark Williams and
Alan Riach note, "there has been an embarrassed silence about the religious aspects of
[Harris's] writing" (Riach 50).
Before we proceed to Part Two, however, it must be noted that I do not mean to
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suggest that Harris himself is a "Christian" in any traditional sense o f the word;20 nor do I
mean to argue that Harris draws solely upon biblical imagery in Palace. Indeed, the
seven-day river journey may be read in any one of many contexts (fittingly, given its
creolized nature). Hena Maes-Jelinek, Sandra Drake, and Antonio Benitez-Rojo have
thoroughly treated Harris’s evocation o f the quest for the mythic El Dorado, the
"quintessential myth of the post-Columbian Caribbean" (Drake 5);21 Michael Gilkes
offers a brilliant reading of the seven-day river journey as the seven stages of the
alchemical process (Gilkes, Wilson Harris 36-40); and Drake has discussed the various
images from Amerindian and African folk lore at work in Palace as well as numerous
references to Eastern religious ideas and symbols (Drake 49-70). Certainly one could
read this commingling o f Western and non-Western religious and mythic images in
Palace as another way in which Harris "creolizes" his fiction.
Finally, when addressing Harris's fiction it is imperative to recognize that his
aesthetic program is ultimately a field of experiment in which nothing is ever final or
complete. To say that Harris has "achieved" anything in his fiction—that he has
"successfully" overcome the language of dichotomies— would be once again to fall into
the trap o f binary discourse, as "success" implies its opposite. Harris has called fiction
writing an "infinite rehearsal," a continual practicing and refining o f technique for a
"production" that, paradoxically, the players know will never materialize. The critic must
"finally" conclude that nothing in Harris is final; in Palace, inasmuch as Harris succeeds
in de- and re-creating the biblical creation story, we must inevitably read it—and the rest
o f his oeuvre— as an "unfinished Genesis" (Harris, Four Banks 9).

PART TWO: “AN ENDING IN NOTHING”

And it was all play, and no one could tell what it had lived and worked for. A striving,
and a striving, and an ending in nothing.
Olive Schreiner, Story of an African Farm

Harris’s concept o f an “unfinished Genesis,” a positive envisioning o f a never
completed creative project, recalls and echoes Schreiner’s earlier lament that, at the end
o f her life and oeuvre, she was “only a broken and untried possibility” (CronwrightSchreiner, Letters 227). Had Schreiner been able to embrace this condition as creative (as
did Harris) rather than lament it (one thinks of Beckett’s paradoxically optimistic
admonition to “fail better”), perhaps her fiction, like that of Harris, would have come
closer to escaping the kind of dualistic ideology from which she so longed to be free.
However, in even attempting to purge the biases inherent in her culture and language,
Olive Schreiner was well before her time. As mentioned above, much of the negative
appraisal o f Story o f an African Farm has stemmed from the fact that critics have
examined it in the light o f other late-nineteenth-century, Victorian novels. It is time to
view Schreiner’s Story through a new postcolonial critical lens.
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In what is still very much a standard study on the general character o f the
Victorian age, The Victorian Frame o f Mind 11830-18701 Walter Houghton describes the
almost alarming exultation with which many Victorians cast off their Christian faith in
favor o f science:
The new vision o f a ‘scientific’ universe was a nightmare—and it was a glorious
dream, as men discovered that much or all o f dogmatic Christianity was sheer
superstition, thank God, and looked forward, with joyful anticipation in some
cases, to a new revelation o f man’s destiny. To put the situation another way, if
modernism for most Victorians threatened to destroy the comforts o f belief, for a
substantial minority it promised to end the ^ c o m fo rts o f belief. (Houghton 48)
Houghton goes on to delineate two specific discomforts the shedding o f faith “relieved”
for the Victorian thinker: the intellectual and emotional burdens the Christian faith
placed on the believer. Intellectually, he says, it was difficult, if not impossible, for many
Victorians to accept the “miraculous character o f Christian theology: the story o f creation
in Genesis, the incarnation, the virgin birth . . . A liberal effort to free the mind from
these ‘Hebrew old clothes’ seemed to many thinkers the major need o f the age” (48-49).
Further, the emotional fear of damnation, the inability to reconcile the “conception o f a
jealous God o f wrath, punishing most o f the human race with eternal torture in hell” (51)
with a God o f love, the Calvinist idea o f human nature, “innately corrupt and powerless to
attain salvation except by an act of divine grace,” and the corresponding “anxious self-
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examination in a frantic effort to determine whether one was among the elect or the
damned” (51) all led to the formation of a context of “living fear from which any escape,
even at the cost of all religious faith, might seem at times a blessed event” (51).
It is indeed indicative o f Schreiner’s Victorian “frame of mind” that, despite her
foreign location, it is precisely these two “discomforts”—the intellectual and the
emotional—that inform and direct her structural revisions of Genesis in the middle space
o f Storv. the “Times and Seasons” chapter. On the one hand, her “failed” revision of
Genesis One (which ultimately rejects God for science/Nature itself) speaks to the
intellectual credulity she felt must accompany belief in such “miraculous” bibl ical
accounts; on the other, the presence of the seeming dichotomy between God’s wrath and
love in “Times and Seasons” (and her eventual abandonment of either conception of God
in favor o f Nature) speaks to the emotional fears instilled by her rearing and instruction in
her mother’s Calvinist faith. Further, her very inclusion of the idea o f God’s wrath (in the
Bible, a result o f Adam’s sin in Genesis Three) in an allegory that is ostensibly concerned
with the first chapter o f Genesis points to the novel’s postcolonial condition: “new
beginnings” (like a colony) will always be “contaminated” by what has gone before, by
what has already begun (in a colony, the pre-existing indigenous and colonial cultures
“get in the way” of an absolute beginning; in “Times and Seasons,” the entirety o f
scripture and its teachings on justice/mercy “gets in the way” of Schreiner’s attempt to
write a new beginning).
Indeed, questionings that derive from both the intellectual and emotional modes of
discomfort surface from the outset o f the novel. Before entering into a detailed
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discussion, however, some background to the novel and its plot and characters will be
helpful. The Storv of an African Farm, published in 1883 by Chapman and Hall after it
was recommended by their reader, George Meredith, is set in pre-industrial South Africa
(circa 1858-1867). Most o f the narrative takes place on the African farm, with its cast of
characters functioning as a “microcosm o f the polyglot culture of South Africa”
(Monsman 49). The central characters on the farm represent the confluence o f various
races/nationalities: Old Otto, the simple-minded German overseer, is father to the dark,
brooding Waldo, the tragic hero o f the novel (who in many ways recalls Emily Bronte’s
Heathcliff). Tant Sannie, the “boorish” Boer (Dutch) owner of the farm, and Bonaparte
Blenkins, the Irish charlatan who attempts to seduce her in order to steal the farm, serve
as comic foils to the rest o f the characters. Tant Sannie’s English stepdaughter, Em
(whose father owned the farm before his death), is cousin to Lyndall, the tragic feminist
heroine whose denunciation o f traditional sex roles and male domination has led critics to
class her as one of the earliest sympathetic portrayals of the “New Woman” (48).
Another significant character (though he resists classification as either tragic or comic) is
Gregory Rose, who surfaces in Part Two as Lyndall’s would-be lover, but who eventually
gets in touch with his decidedly feminine nature by cross-dressing as a nurse in order to
be close to the dying heroine. And, never far in the background, a host of subservient
“Kaffirs” and “Hottentots” appear, completing the picture of the primary social units in
mid-nineteenth-century South Africa.
The bipartite novel tells primarily two stories: W aldo’s story in Part One,
Lyndall’s story in Part Two (although we continue to glimpse Waldo throughout Part
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Two, as we get glimpses of Lyndall throughout Part One). Waldo and Lyndall serve,
respectively, as the narrative mouthpieces through which Schreiner voices her religious
and feminist concerns: thus, Part One details Waldo’s spiritual crisis o f belief in, and
eventual disgust and disillusionment with, the religious beliefs o f his father Otto; Part
Two traces Lyndall’s contempt for patriarchal society and assertion o f her own sexual
liberation. At first glance, the novel’s bipartite division seems to suggest a textual
parallel to the Old/New Testament structure of the Bible. Indeed, the opening pages of
the novel immediately evoke (what the novel will continually depict as) the Old
Testament God o f wrath, as Waldo lies awake, listening to the inexorable ticking o f his
father’s watch and pondering the irrevocable, unchangeable will o f God in sending
countless souls into the pit o f hell:
The boy lay with his eyes wide open. He saw before him a long stream o f people,
a great dark multitude, that moved in one direction; then they came to the dark
edge o f the world, and went over . . . And all the while the watch kept ticking on;
just like God’s will, that never changes or alters, you may do what you please.
(Story 37)
Moreover, the farm in Part One—ruled by the domineering hand o f Bonaparte Bienkins, a
vagabond who arrives on the farm in Chapter Three and proceeds, through lies and
deception (taking advantage o f Tant Sannie’s and Otto’s ignorance and credulity), to
usurp Otto’s place as overseer and become schoolmaster to the girls— also ignites images
o f Old Testament Israel, where the Letter o f the Law ruled, often to the exclusion of
mercy. By contrast, the farm in Part Two, in which Bonaparte has been expelled from the
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farm (after Tant Sannie catches him seducing her niece) and the gentler and more
feminine hands o f Tant Sannie, Em, and the cross-dressing Gregory Rose have taken
charge o f it, ostensibly recalls the New Testament world where the old Jewish patriarch
has been displaced and an (ultimately illusory) freedom and equality reigns—a “freedom”
that might lure one into believing, as it were, that on the farm “There is neither Jew nor
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians
3:28).
Yet this surface reading, on closer examination, quickly falls apart, as Part One
displays a contaminatory mixing together of both Old and New Testament
stories/perspectives—their “miscegenation,” to “use the pejorative term; or, their
“creolization,” to speak from the more positive perspective o f someone like Harris.
Despite this mixing of Old and New Testament-stories, however, at the end of Part One
the figures o f Old (divine justice) and New (divine mercy) Testaments remain in binary
opposition to one another in the characters of Bienkins and Otto, as discussed below
(thereby necessitating a new Genesis, which materializes in “Times and Seasons”).
We first see this commingling (and thus effective dismantling) o f Old and New
Testaments in the subsection o f the novel’s first chapter entitled “The Sacrifice,” where
Waldo conflates Old and New Testament prayers as he offers a mutton chop before the
Lord on a rough-hewn altar o f twelve stones (a number that evokes the twelve tribes of
Israel). He calls out and asks God, like the Old Testament Elijah before the prophets o f
Baal (see 1 Kings 18:16-40), to “send fire down from heaven to bum it” (Storv 40),
although where Elijah offers a bull Waldo can only supply a mutton chop— a good
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example o f the “inferiority” of colonial mimesis (from one perspective) or (from another)
its parodicity. Waldo then continues, “Thou hast said, Whosoever shall say unto this
mountain, Be thou cast into the sea, nothing doubting, it shall be done” (40). This recalls
Christ’s words in Matthew 17:20, “if you have faith as small as a mustard seed, you can
say to this mountain, ‘Move from here to there’ and it will move.”22
However, unlike the God of the Old Testament who does indeed send fire down
from heaven to consume the offering, Waldo’s God remains silent, and Waldo, after
waiting till sunset and watching the mutton chop merely melt over the stones in the heat,
“broke down the altar, and threw the meat far, far away into the field” (41). He
concludes, in an ironic recoding of the account of Elijah (where Elijah and the Baal
worshippers finally affirm the existence and sovereignty o f God: “The Lord-he is God!”
[1 Kings 18:39]), “I am like Cain-I am not His. He will not hear my prayer. God hates
me” (41). Thus, Schreiner mixes the Old Testament story o f Elijah’s faith with the New
Testament Christological teaching on faith, and ends up with a parodic outcome: Waldo,
who like Elijah affirms God’s existence and sovereignty, pictures himself as being
outside of God’s love; in Calvinistic terms, he sees himself as being one of the damned.
Schreiner’s conflation of Old and New Testament texts here thus has the effect o f
introducing the very dichotomy between God’s love and his wrath that is central to the
novel.
This dichotomy is again evoked on the page following the mutton chop non
miracle, where Waldo confesses (in yet another Old Testament/New Testament
commingling): “I love Jesus Christ, but I hate God” (42). But this privileging o f one
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conception of God (the Son who offers mercy) over another (the Father who demands
justice) is fraught with irony, if only because the New Testament teaches in no uncertain
terms that Jesus Christ is God,The familiar concept of the Incarnation (cf. John 1:1: “In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”).
W aldo’s “confession” that he loves Christ (mercy) but hates God (judgement) relies on a
binary opposition, an either/or, that the biblical doctrine of Christ’s propitiation undoes
(see my Conclusion). This “confession” (“I hate God”) also points to the arrival of the
hated Bonaparte Bienkins, who is Waldo’s Old Testament God personified, and the
Irishman’s juxtaposition with Waldo’s real father Otto, who represents the Jesus Christ
whom Waldo “loves.” Thus, Bonaparte Bienkins and Otto represent the Old and New
Testaments, judging God versus merciful Christ, respectively— an ironic reversal of
biblical “order,” inasmuch as Bonaparte is a new, intrusive presence on the farm who
displaces its old caretaker.
Gerald Monsman has noted that the figure o f Bienkins is a “mythic/parodic
representation o f patriarchal power” (Monsman 61), as indeed he is: overseer,
schoolmaster, preacher o f death and damnation. During his Sunday sermon he relates the
ridiculous tale o f how he climbed to the top o f a seething volcano, Mt. Etna, and peered
down inside to witness the churning skeleton o f a man who committed suicide over a lost
love upon a “lake of fire and brimstone” (Storv 71). He tells this obvious lie in the midst
o f preaching a sermon on the topic, “All liars shall have their part in the lake which
bumeth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death” (70). Besides the obvious
irony (he lies to illustrate his point), we note the lack o f any New Testament rhetoric of
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forgiveness for sins; Bonaparte is firmly ensconced within (what is viewed as) an Old
Testament rhetoric of adherence to the letter of the law, and within a vision o f the world
that sees in the “second death” (ironically, a New Testament idea [cf. Revelation 20:14])
a definitive ending, rather than the opportunity for a new beginning with which, as we
have seen, Harris associates it.
Bonaparte is further linked to the Old Testament God in the Garden o f Eden when
he questions Waldo about the young man’s frequent visits to the loft. After Otto’s death
(Tant Sannie sends Otto away because she believes the lies Bienkins tells about him, but
just before he is to leave Otto dies peacefully-and somewhat pathetically-in his sleep),
Waldo discovers a set o f books in the loft that once belonged to Em ’s father. Bienkins,
who after Otto’s demise assumes the role o f father to Waldo, decides that, since there is
•neither alcohol nor a woman up in the loft, Waldo must be eating Tant Sannie’s dried
peaches (even though Tant Sannie muses, “He must have been a great fool to eat my
peaches . . . they are full o f mites as a sheepskin, and as hard as stones” [121]). In a
confrontation that alludes to God’s confrontation with Adam in the Garden after he had
eaten o f the fruit o f the Tree o f the Knowledge o f Good and Evil (but note the ironic
displacement from fresh fruit to dried), Bonaparte demands, “Waldo, answer me . . . have
you, or have you not, did you, or did you not, eat of the peaches in the loft?” (122). He
then announces Waldo’s punishment by confinement: “It will enable you, Waldo, to
reflect on the enormity o f the sin you have committed against our Father in heaven”
(123), again linking the episode to Adam’s Fall. Here, as Monsman points out,
“Bienkins’s fatherhood and God’s are inseparable-fraudulent and tyrannical” (Monsman
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63).
Bienkins is again portrayed as a merciless, judging “father” when he beats Waldo
for “stealing” the peaches: “‘Chasten thy son while there is hope,’” he says before casting
the first blow, “‘and let not thy soul spare for his crying.’ Those are God’s words. I shall
act as a father to you, Waldo” (124). Obviously, this “act” does not succeed; Bonaparte’s
hypocrisy is soon exposed when Tant Sannie, whom Bonaparte has been courting,
witnesses him seducing her young niece Trana and pours a barrel o f pickled mutton chops
onto his head at the climax o f his passionate lovemaking (a rather more effective use of
mutton chops than Waldo’s, one might note!). Bonaparte is thus mercifully sent away,
with the ironic last words spoken to Waldo, “May the blessing of my God and m y fa th e r’s
God rest on you, now and evermore” (133-my italics).
Bonaparte’s final words call to mind Waldo’s earthly father, Otto, who is set in
diametrical opposition to Bienkins and embodies the grace and mercy o f the New
Testament Jesus Christ. Otto is perpetually “turning the other cheek,” doing good unto
his enemies (e.g., giving his Sunday suit and sermon to Bienkins), and living as a “Good
Samaritan.” The obvious allusion to this parable (Luke 10:30-37) occurs when Otto finds
the wife of the Kaffir herdsman (who has been “turned out” because twenty sheep are
discovered missing; we later learn that Bienkins was responsible) lying next to a milkbush with her infant tied to her back. After ascertaining that the Kaffir woman had been
“turned away” unjustly, he returns with food and gives her his “old brown salt-and-pepper
coat” (88). Otto is here equated with the Samaritan in Christ’s parable, who is deemed a
“neighbor” to the battered stranger (left for dead along the side of the road from
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Jerusalem to Jericho) because he “shewed mercy on him” (Luke 10:37). Even when Tant
Sannie sends Otto away due to Bonaparte’s lies, the old man neither resists nor places
blame; he merely composes a pathetically optimistic letter to Lyndall and Em, exhorting
them to “serve the Saviour; give your hearts to Him while you are yet young. Life is
short” (94).
Yet, for all his goodness and innocence, Otto—the parodic embodiment o f New
Testament Christological mercy—is a senescent fool. He is naive in his charity; it never
occurs to him that the Kaffir woman to whom he gives his cloak “would creep back to the
huts at the homestead when the darkness favoured her” (88). He is blind to Blenkins’s
duplicitous nature; indeed, he takes Christ’s teaching that “inasmuch as ye have done it
unto one o f the least o f these my brethren, ye have done it unto me“ (Matthew 25:40) to
the literal extreme as he gazes upon Blenkins’s sleeping form: “He [Otto] saw not the
bloated body nor the evil face of the man; but, as it were, under deep disguise and fleshly
concealment, the form that long years o f dreaming had made very real to him. ‘Jesus,
lover . . . to serve Thee, to take Thee in!” ’ (57). Significantly, it is “dreaming” that makes
Christ real to him, and not fact; Otto is unable to dissociate the dream and the reality.
Indeed, for him there may be no difference between the two, between a story and a fact:
when Lyndall asks him how he knows the stories Bienkins tells are true, his ire is aroused
and he cries out, “‘That is what I do hate! . . . Know that is true! How do you know that
anything is true? Because you are told so . . . How do you know that God talked to
Moses, except that Moses wrote it?” (62). Finally, he takes his “turn the other cheek”
credo too far when Tant Sannie exiles him from the farm; as he prepares to leave all his
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possessions save one small bundle “he never thought of entering a protest against the loss
o f his goods: like a child he submitted, and wept” (94). Rachel Blau Duplessis has
observed that, through the parodic Christ-figure of Otto, Schreiner “exploits the literal
perversity of such extreme faith” and “propounds the blasphemous notion that to live
uncritically according to the literal Christian story is to put the devil in power” (Blau
Duplessis 22). If, as Christ tells his disciples when he “sends them out like sheep among
the wolves,” Christians are to be “as shrewd as snakes and as innocent as doves”
(Matthew 10:16), Otto falls pathetically short on the former count.
Thus, at the end of Part One Waldo (and, by extension, the reader) is left in a
world where both the (parodic versions of the) Old and New Testament Gods have been
displaced: the former expelled from the Garden himself, the latter dead, never to rise
again. At the end o f Part One Waldo no'longer hates God, but quite simply denies his
existence: ‘“ There is no God!’ he almost hissed; ‘no God; not anywhere!’” (102). After
being exposed to all this negation in Part One, the reader could hardly be surprised by the
tone o f the epigraph that opens Part Two, but might well be in a better position to decode
its relevance to the Bible: “And it was all play, and no one could tell what it had lived
and worked for. A striving [Blenkins/Old Testament justice], and a striving [Otto/New
Testament mercy], and an ending in nothing” (135-my brackets).
The useless striving o f the various fathers and sons in Part One makes room, in
Part Two, for a narrative centered around Lyndall; feminist critics have picked up on this
aspect of the novel and its attempt (in Blau Duplessis’s words) to go “beyond the ending”
of conventional patriarchal scripts to which nineteenth-century women writers were
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condemned. But I will be focusing on the novel’s structural center, the anomalous
chapter “Times and Seasons,” an ambivalent middle passage between its two gendered
parts that depicts, in seven separate stages, the spiritual and intellectual growth of a
child’s mind from infancy through childhood. In the seven sections of this chapter,
Schreiner attempts to “re-create” religious belief;.it is her own “Genesis” o f sorts. This
“beginning,” coming at the halfway point of the novel, suggests the colonial condition
itself, as colonial cultures (which conceive of themselves, as I have argued, as Genesis
like experiments in the creation o f new worlds, just as Schreiner’s chapter is an
experiment in the creation of a new religious order) always begin in the middle. While
attempting to be “new,” they actually interrupt an existing narrative and extend another
narrative (itself already “old”) over top of it. In this sense, as I have argued, the colonial
culture/text will always-already contain elements of the postcolonial, as will be evidenced
by the failure of Schreiner’s allegorization o f Genesis One to conform to (or entirely
escape) its original model.
Perhaps it is only fitting, then, to begin discussing the “Times and Seasons”
chapter in its own middle with Schreiner’s depiction of a (failed) allegorical reading of
the Bible. In stage four o f the seven-part narrative, the child (who remains nameless,
although most critics agree that he is most likely Waldo himself), assailed by religious
doubt, “yeam[s] for a token from the inexorably silent one” (Storv 142). He grabs the
Bible, puts his finger down on a page, and bends to read, confident that what he will
encounter is the very voice o f God speaking directly to his heart. With bated breath the
child looks down and reads, “‘Then fourteen years after I went up again to Jerusalem with
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Barnabas, and took Titus with me also”’ (143). The child’s imagination “seizes it for a
moment: we are twisting, twirling, trying to make an allegory” (143). But a sudden
loathing comes to him as he realizes the futility of his efforts; “we seize the book, swing
it round our head, and fling it with all our might to the farther end o f the room. We put
down our head again and weep” (143).
The child’s failed attempt to make an allegory out of a biblical passage that resists
allegorization, which on the literal level simply pictures Waldo’s acute religious strife, is
almost eerily self-reflexive as it images failed allegorical reading within a “failed”
allegorical reading. As I have begun to argue, the seven-stage allegory is structurally
disordered (and thus “fails”) in two ways: its seven days are “out o f order,” initially
offering only a very loose parallel with, and eventually failing to parallel at all, the seven
days o f creation outlined in Genesis One; and the dichotomy between divine justice and
mercy raised in the chapter is “out of order” as these ideas are not a part o f Genesis One
but are first raised later, in Genesis Three, where God’s wrath manifests itself only after
Adam and Eve succumb to the serpent’s wiles and, contrary to God’s will, eat the fruit
from the Tree o f the Knowledge o f Good and Evil.
The very chapter title, “Times and Seasons,” is itself “out o f order” as it hearkens
to yet another passage of scripture that comes after Genesis in the Old Testament, the oftquoted verse in the book of Ecclesiastes, “To every thing there is a season, and a time to
every purpose under the heaven” (Eccl. 3:1). This statement comes at the end o f King
Solomon’s (the psuedonymous author) reflection on the vanity o f all things, a two-chapter
re visitation o f his life’s work, in which he determines that the strivings of his entire life
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have been in vain: “Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity”
(Eccl. 1:2). Thus the chapter (in which we expect to “begin anew”) in effect begins
at/with the end, which ironically situates (indeed, contaminates) the seven-stage narrative
that follows.
Schreiner now engages in a depiction o f these seven stages of the psyche’s
development, which she likens to times and seasons: “The soul’s life has seasons o f its
own; periods not found in any calendar, times that years and months will not scan” (137).
Recalling the allusion to Ecclesiastes, in which the “times and seasons” o f life have been
pronounced “vanity of vanities,” we begin to get a sense of the direction the seven stages
will take. The first stage (infancy) seems, at first, loosely to parallel the first day o f
creation in Genesis, upon which God creates light: “And God said, Let there be light: and
there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from
the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night” (Gen. 1:35a)23. Similarly, the infant in stage one is separating light from darkness: “from the
shadowy background o f forgetfulness start out pictures o f startling clearness,
disconnected, but brightly colored, and indelibly printed in the mind” (Storv 137). Note,
however, that the infant in this stage is not acting (as is God in the Genesis narrative) but
is a passive participant in the process. “Light” and “dark” binaries abound as various
pictures from the natural world start out and become permanently, “startlingly,”
impressed upon the infant’s mind (in an almost Wordsworthian, “spots o f time” fashion),
like the “warm summer’s evening” when “we have yet the taste o f bread and milk in our
mouth, and the red sunset is reflected in our basin” (137); or the “dark night” when the
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child wakes with the “fear that there is some great being in the room” (137). Schreiner
even invokes the image of the rainbow (the visible manifestation of light itself) in this
stage, saying it is the picture that “starts out more vividly than any” (138). However, here
the narrative again departs structurally from its model, as the image of light is already
“contaminated” by the image of the rainbow, which is not introduced in the Bible until
Genesis Nine. Moreover, the rainbow is a sign of the covenant God makes with Noah
and “every living creature that is with you, for perpetual generations” (9:12) that “neither
shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there any more be
a flood to destroy the earth” (9:11). The image o f the rainbow thus necessarily conjures
up the dichotomy between God’s wrath (i.e., he destroyed the world because o f the
proliferation o f wickedness [cf. Gen. 6:5-6]) and his mercy (i.e., he promises to never
destroy the earth in this manner again).
This dichotomy begins to manifest itself more and more clearly in the subsequent
stages/days o f development, even as the already loose parallel to the creation story begins
to dissipate further. On the biblical second day of creation, God causes a great separation
between the sky and the water:24 “And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst o f
the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament,
and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were
above the firmament: and it was so. And God called the firmament Heaven” (Gen. 1:58; in the NIV, “Heaven” is translated “sky”). In Schreiner’s second stage, the reader
strains to find the sort of parallels that seemed to offer themselves up in the first stage.
The child does become aware of his own separation from the surrounding material world
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(“Material things still rule, but the spiritual and intellectual take their places” \Story
138]), and he does develop a concept o f self while looking up at the sky (“One day we sit
there and look up at the blue sky, and down at our fat little knees; and suddenly it strikes
us, Who are we? This I, what is it?” [139-note again, as with the binaries between light
and dark in stage one, stage two also posits binary distinctions: matter vs. spirit, self vs.
other]). However, it is a stretch to say that this section in any way directly parallels the
biblical second day o f creation. In the Bible, the firmament (sky) is placed over the
material world (the water below); in Schreiner’s stage two, the material world “still
rules.” Furthermore, whereas in Genesis God is actively engaged in the creation o f the
sky, in stage two the child is depicted as the passive receptor of a suggestion (namely, his
own separation from the surrounding material world) that is prompted by his
contemplation o f the sky.
Indeed, the more striking issue that comes into play in this stage is the
introduction of fear into the child’s psyche: “We try to look in upon ourself, and ourself
beats back upon ourself. Then we get up in great fear and run home as hard as we can.
We can’t tell what frightened us” (139); or again, on a dark night, “when we are afraid,
we pray and shut our eyes. We press our fingers very hard upon the lids, and see dark
spots moving round and round, and we know they are heads and wings o f angels sent to
take care o f us . . . It is very consoling” (138). The concept o f fear is nowhere present in
Genesis One, but is one o f the first results o f the Fall in Genesis Three (Adam and Eve,
fearing God’s wrath, “hid[e] themselves from the presence o f the Lord God” [3:8] after
they eat the fruit o f the Tree o f the Knowledge o f Good and Evil). Thus, in stage two we
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again encounter the two structural “failures” we identified at the outset o f this thesis: 1) it
does not adhere in any obvious way to the events of Day Two in Genesis, and 2) it is
contaminated by an idea introduced only later in Genesis, and thus is “disordered” in
terms o f the original biblical structure.
This structural disorder continues into the third day/stage as well, which, like the
first two stages, departs significantly from the biblical third day o f creation (and almost
seems to begin to invert the parallels). In the biblical creation narrative, life begins to
flourish (“waters under the heaven [are] gathered together unto one place” [1:9], dry land
appears, and vegetation is produced [“And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding
seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind”
[1:12]). Here, significantly, the author of Genesis makes it clear that God created life to
contain within itself the ability to re-generate (through its seed). But, whereas the events
o f the biblical Day Three suggest perpetual regeneration, Schreiner’s narrative suggests
the opposite as the child’s questions begin to focus on perpetual damnation:
Occasionally, also, unpleasantly shrewd questions begin to be asked by someone,
we know not who, who sits behind our shoulder . . . we carry the questions to the
grown-up people .. . and they say it was kind of God to make hell, and very
loving o f Him to send men there; and besides, He couldn’t help himself; and they
are very wise, we think, so we believe them-more or less. (140)
Even the child’s religiosity is motivated by the fear of damnation: “At night we are
profoundly religious; even the ticking watch says ‘Eternity, eternity! Hell, hell, hell!” ’
(140).

The child’s questions in this stage are not only indicative o f the way in which
ideas introduced in future chapters o f Genesis (the idea of punishment for evil in a place
o f eternal damnation; i.e., Hell) infiltrate Schreiner’s version of Genesis One, but they >
also raise what most see as the central problem in the Genesis creation narrative itself
(indeed, what is perhaps the most pressing theological/philosophical question raised in.,
the Bible): where does evil come from in a creation that is all good? After all, at the end
o f his work God pronounces all he has made good: “And God saw every thing that he
had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Schreiner’s narrative thus
reveals itself as nicely self-reflexive once again; using the Genesis framework, she raises
the crucial theological problem with the Genesis account itself (how could good beget
evil?). Thus, the binary divisions between good and evil, merciful and damning God,
become increasingly stark, evidenced again in the way the child in this stage draws a
strict division between the Old and New testaments: after reading Christ’s Sermon on the
Mount (Matthew 5 ff.), the child asserts, “The Ten Commandments and the old ‘Thou
Shalt’ we have heard about long enough, and don’t care about it; but this new law sets us
on fire” (139).
These binary distinctions between old and new, judging and loving, hell and
heaven, most obviously “contaminate” stage four, which is the last o f Schreiner’s stages
to retain even loose (and ironically inverted) structural parallels to the Genesis account.
On day four in the Bible, God creates the heavenly realms (“And God made two great
lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the
stars also” [Genesis 1:16]). Yet again, Schreiner’s narrative parodically recodes the
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Genesis narrative: while sunlight imagery does abound on Schreiner’s fourth “day,” it
serves to remind the child not of the “vault o f heaven” but o f hell:
We look at the walls of the farm-house . .. with the merry sunshine playing over
all, and do not see it. But we see a great white throne, and Him that sits on i t . . .
And the music rises higher, and rends the vault o f heaven with its unutterable
sweetness. And we, as we listen, ever and anon, as it sinks on the sweetest,
lowest note, hear a groan of the damned from below. We shudder in the sunlight.
(140)
It is also in the sunlight that the child remembers Jeremy Taylor’s Sermons on the
torments o f hell (the “real fire of which this temporal fire [i.e. the sun] is but a painted
fire” [140-41]) and concludes in the face of such inexorable torment, “what matter
sunshine and walls, men and sheep? The things which are seen are temporal, but the
things which are not seen are eternal” (141) 25 Once again, Schreiner revises the Genesis
account by both recalling the biblical narrative (via sunlight imagery) and ironically
departing from that narrative (i.e, the sunlight recalls hell, not the “firmament of heaven”
in which God places the sun).
The fourth stage is also, like the preceding three, infiltrated by the dichotomy,
nowhere present in Genesis One, between a loving and judging God. Indeed, the “shrewd
questions” pertaining to the existence of evil in the world are now “asked louder. We
carry them to the grown-up people; they answer us, and we are not satisfied” (140). The
Devil (thought not to be introduced in the Bible until Genesis 3:1) is identified as the one
who sat “behind [the] shoulder” o f the child in stage three and provoked the “shrewd
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questions:” “the Devil walks with us. . . He is never silenced—without mercy. Though
the drops of blood stand out on your heart he will put his questions . . . ‘Is it good of God
to make hell? Was it kind of Him to let no one be forgiven unless Jesus Christ died?’”
(141). Not only does the child recognize the dichotomy between a loving and damning
God, but he also confronts the dichotomy between God’s goodness and his own innate
depravity (again, a concept not understood to be introduced in Genesis until after the
Fall): “God is good, very good. We are wicked, very wicked . . . Too vile to live, too vile
to die, too vile to creep over this, God’s earth, and move among His believing men”
(142). The “Devil” finally forces the child to face the Calvinist doctrine of the
predestination of the elect: “Is it right there should be a chosen people? To Him, who is
father to all, should not all be dear?” (142). It is no wonder that this is the point at which
the child, like Schreiner herself, “flings” the Bible across the room; the allegory of
creation (s)he is looking for is faltering structurally as it both proves incapable o f one-toone mimesis and becomes increasingly contaminated by binary distinctions that ought to
have no place in her (re)created Genesis, since they are raised only in later chapters of the
Bible.
From this point on, Schreiner’s narrative structure departs entirely from the
Genesis text as the child/Schreiner begins to looks for a “way out” o f the oppositional
dichotomies presented in the first four stages. In the Genesis creation text, the
oppositional hierarchies continue through the fifth and sixth days, as God creates animals
and man (giving humans dominion over the “fish of the sea, and over the fowl o f the air,
and over the cattle, and over all the earth” [1:26]; he then commands man and woman to
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“replenish the earth, and subdue it” [1:28]). God finally rests on the seventh day (and
even privileges this day over the others, blessing and sanctifying it [2:3]). Schreiner’s
day o f rest, however, is alarmingly displaced to day five: “Before us there were three
courses possible-to go mad, to die, to sleep. We take the latter course; or Nature takes it
for us” (144-note that the supernatural [God] is replaced here by Nature). Instead of
being created, the “beasts, birds, the very flowers close their eyes, and the streams are still
in winter; all things take rest; then why not the human reason also?” (144-45). Indeed,
the Devil himself rests (in yet another radical revision o f the Genesis text, where only
God is present): “So the questioning Devil in us drops asleep” (145).
This displaced day of rest is perhaps the most obvious structural departure in the
chapter; and the “contamination” of the allegory continues even here, as the sleeping soul
dreams o f an all-loving, all-beneficent Christ—obviously a New Testament figure
(although the Bible itself holds that the pre-incamate Christ was present and active at the
creation [cf. John 1:1]). The child has not been able to reconcile the dichotomy between
a vengeful God and merciful Christ in his waking hours; he now attempts (for the last
time, and only in the context o f a dream) to retain a vestige o f religious hope by
privileging the merciful deity over the judging one. Initially, the child “find[s] Him in
everything in those days” (145), and “laughs” when the “poor sleepy, half-dead Devil”
rears his head with his old questions. The child sees in the “purple flowers” the eyes o f
Christ (145); feels he is holding Christ himself when he carries home the “little weary
lamb” (145); and has compassion on the “drunken Kaffir” lying on the roadside in the
sun, covering him with a blanket (“[God’s] Kaffir; why should the sun hurt him?” [145]).
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The child goes on to reconceive the biblical God (who places his judgement—i.e., death—
upon all his creation as a consequence for Adam’s disobedience in Genesis Three) as a
Being who shows only mercy toward his creation:
In the centre of all things is a Mighty Heart, which, having begotten all things,
. loves them; and, having bom them into life, beats with great throbs o f love toward
them. No death for His dear insects, no hell for His dear men, no burning up for
His dear world-His own, own world that He has made. (145)
This dream quickly turns to nightmare, however, as the child cannot entirely banish the
concept o f a judging deity from his mind, and finally rejects both the damning and
merciful concepts of God entirely. Attending church with his father, the child listens to
the preacher’s sermon upon the text, “ ‘He that believeth not shall be damned.’” The child
knows the preacher’s words refer to the soul o f the “magistrate’s clerk,” who professed to
be an atheist and who “just the day before .. . had died in the street, stmck by lightning”
(146). As the preacher goes on to describe the outpouring o f the wrath of the “Mighty
One, whose existence [the clerk] had denied” and the damned soul’s flight into the
“everlasting shade,” the child becomes enraged:
He lies! . . . That man in the pulpit lies! Will no one stop him? Have none of
them heard—do none o f them know, that when the poor dark soul shut its eyes on
earth it opened them in the still light o f heaven? that there is no wrath where
God’s face is? . . . While the atheist lay wondering and afraid, God bent down and
said, ‘My child, here I am .. . Then the poor soul turned to the light,—its weakness
and pain were gone forever. (146-47)
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Yet the child recognizes, even in the midst of his anger, that this idea of an all-merciful
God is his own: when his father jolts him out o f his angry reverie, the child admits he can
“see nothing but [his] own ideas” (147). Indeed, in an earlier authorial interposition (in
which Schreiner switches from present to past tense narrative), the soul cries, “Jesus!
You Jesus o f our dream! How we loved you; no Bible tells o f you as we knew;you” (145-my italics). The child can now only awaken to what he has determined to be the “truth”:
the non-existence of either of his previous versions o f God.
This “awakening” occurs simultaneously in the next two sections, stages six and
seven, which Schreiner conflates in her allegorical version o f Genesis (i.e., both stages
chronicle the child’s “time o f waking” [148]). Again, this is another structural deviation
from the biblical narrative, in which the creation of animals and humans occurs on day
six, while God finally rests “from all his work which [he] created and made” on the
seventh day (Genesis 2:3).26 In Schreiner’s account, the soul awakens in a manner that
echoes the creation of man in Genesis 2:7 (note again, her Genesis One creation narrative
is infiltrated by an event from Genesis Two), where God crafts Adam out o f dust and
breathes life into his nostrils: “now life takes us up between her finger and thumb, shakes
us furiously .. . and she sets us down a little hardly on the bare earth, bruised and sore,
but pretematurally wide awake” (148)27. Here, anticipating the gender dynamics o f Part
Two, the patriarchal God of Genesis has been displaced by a feminine entity; and, unlike
Adam, who wakes to the natural world in the Garden of Eden, the soul in Schreiner’s
account is “pretematurally” wide awake (suggesting that the soul has some kind o f
awareness that is outside of, or above, the natural realm). It is also ironic that, where
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Adam awakens to life, Schreiner’s soul awakens to death, as life begins to show it “newmade graves . .. eyes that we love with worms eating them” (148). God is nowhere to be
found in the garden of Schreiner’s sixth and seventh stages: “we cry to our beautiful
dream-god .. . now in our hour of need be near us. But He is not there; He is gone away”
(149). It is indeed as if God himself—both the judging and merciful versions—have been
cast out o f Schreiner’s garden, as is obvious in the opening of section seven:
Now we have no God. We have had two: the old God that our fathers handed
down to us, that we hated, and never liked; the new one that we made for
ourselves, that we loved; but now he has flitted away from us, and we see what he
was made of—the shadow o f our highest ideal, crowned and throned. Now we
have no God. (149)
Indeed, the only “God” present throughout the rest o f the novel is Nature, personified as a
female. It is only after the eradication of both diametrically opposing (just and merciful)
conceptions o f the Deity that the soul can truly “see” nature: “And now we turn to
Nature. All these years we have lived beside her, and we have never seen her: now we
open our eyes and look at her” (151). The soul becomes aware of the processes o f
evolution (and thus of another, secular creation story, Darwin’s, to rival the old, sacred
one): “we look down and see [the stone] covered with the fossil footprints o f great birds,
and the beautiful skeleton o f a fish” (152). Significantly, in stage seven the child himself
displaces God as Creator: “We put a brown seed in the earth, and a living thing starts
out—starts upwards . . . shaking brown seeds with little embryo souls onto the ground”
(152-53; note the ironic echoes o f the seed-bearing plants on the third day in Genesis).
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The soul recognizes a transcendental unity in all things, “not a chance jumble; a living
thing, a One” (153). This holistic (and almost Harris-like) concept o f the interrelatedness
o f all things allows the (now adult) soul to conclude (in a vision o f the world resembling
that o f Ecclesiastes in its recognition of the cyclical nature of all things, but drawing an
opposite conclusion as to the “vanity” [or “meaninglessness,” NIV] o f these cycles):
And so it comes to pass in time, that the earth ceases for us to be a weltering
chaos. We walk in the great hall of life, looking up and round reverentially.
Nothing is despicable-#// is meaningful; nothing is small-all is part of a whole,
whose beginning and end we know not. (154-my italics)
This “new life” envisioned in the seventh section is one that knows neither beginnings
nor ends, but that nonetheless makes sense, precisely because it is positioned squarely in
the middle o f the novel.
It would seem, then, that Schreiner, through this ultimately parodic recoding of
the Genesis One story (the inherent binarism o f which is further emphasized by the
contaminatory presence of the justice/mercy dichotomy , which was not originally part of
that story) into a new, organic worldview, has managed to escape the dualistic thinking
and language o f her colonial/Victorian era. Yet Part Two o f the novel, which traces
Lyndall’s return to the farm, clandestine relationship with (and pregnancy by) an
unnamed stranger, tragic illness following the death o f her infant, and her own eventual
death, remains fraught with the kinds o f black and white dualisms Schreiner attempted to
overthrow in both Part One and the “Times and Seasons” chapter.
This is perhaps most evident in Schreiner’s continued treatment o f the African
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natives as “things” and “animals” in Part Two. As Lyndall and Gregory Rose sit together
on the “kopje,” for instance, Gregory begs her to talk to him in the same serious way she
does with W aldo.. Lyndall falls to observing a Kaffir man at the foot o f the kopje:
. . . he is a splendid fellow—six feet high, with a magnificent pair o f legs.
In his leather bag he is going to fetch his rations, and I suppose to kick his
wife with his beautiful legs when he gets home. He has a right to; he
bought her for two oxen .. . There is a lean dog going after him, to whom I
suppose he never gives more than a bone from which he has sucked the
marrow; but his dog loves him, as his wife does . . . He is the most
interesting and intelligent thing I can see just now, except, perhaps, Doss
[a dog]. (227)
She goes on to muse, from the evolutionary perspective promoted in the last section of
“Times and Seasons,” “Will his race melt away in the heat of a collision with a higher?
Are the men o f the future to see his bones only in museums—a vestige o f one link that
spanned between the dog and the white man?” (227-28). Later, as Waldo writes the story
o f his years away from the farm during which he went out to “see the world” and worked
as a clerk in a shop, he seems almost surprised to have found that the only “respectable
thing in that store . . . was the Kaffir storeman. His work was to load and unload, and he
never needed to smile except when he liked” (252-my italics). Finally, in perhaps the
most racist passage of the entire novel, while Waldo is at work planing a new table for
Em, he pauses to throw one o f the curls o f wood “down to a small naked nigger, who had
crept from its mother .. . From time to time the little animal lifted its fat hand as it
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expected a fresh shower of curls; till Doss . . . would catch the curl in his mouth and roll
the little Kaffir over in the sawdust, much to that small anim al’s contentment” (292—my
italics; note how the actual animal, Doss, is called by name, while the Kaffir child is
spoken o f simply as an animal). In all these examples, the dichotomies of the Genesis
narrative remain untransformed: the man versus animal opposition of the sixth day
continues to govern Schreiner’s discourse; she has merely exchanged the literal beasts of
Genesis for metaphorical ones (an exchange that is, moreover, basic to all racist
discourse).
Another dichotomy that is not eradicated, but merely reversed, is that of man
versus woman. In Genesis Two, Eve is created from Adam’s rib and is to be subservient
to Adam, a “suitable helper” (Genesis 2:20) named “woman, for she was taken out of
man” (2:23). Rather than eliminating the idea o f superior/inferior manifest in this section
o f Genesis, Schreiner merely reverses that hierarchical order in the character o f Lyndall.
Lyndall is constantly asserting her independence from masculine domination, as she tells
Em when the latter asks her if she is engaged: “I am not in so great a hurry to put my
neck beneath any man’s foot; and I do not so greatly admire the crying of babies . . .
There are other women glad of such work” (184). She derides the attentions she receives
from men when she tells Waldo, “You are our goods, our merchandise, our material for
operating on; we buy you, we sell you, we keep six of you crawling to our little f e e t. . .
We keep six o f you dancing in the palm o f one little hand . . . then we throw you away,
and you sink to the Devil” (192). Lyndall’s refusal to marry the handsome stranger
whose child she carries, and her insistence upon giving birth to it alone in a hotel room in
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the Transvaal, further emphasize her resistance to and reversal of the biblical male/female
roles. Finally, her relationship with the foppish Gregory Rose (who, Lyndall observes, is
a “true woman—one bom for the sphere that some women have to fill without being born
for it. How happy he would be sewing frills into his little girls’ frocks, and how pretty he
would look sitting in a parlour, with a rough man making love to him!” [197]) in the
chapter entitled “Gregory’s Womanhood” is the very epitome o f male/female role
reversal. As Lyndall, deliriously ill, but still determined never to submit to marriage, lies
dying on a “crimson quilt” in a dark hotel room, Gregory Rose shaves his beard and
dresses as a nurse to be near her until her death. He becomes the servant, the helper (and
to him “his hands were glorified for what they had done” [273]), while Lyndall remains
hardened toward her dead infant (“I did not love it; its father was not my prince; I did not
care for it” [278]) and continues, even in her weakness, to act as “master” over Gregory
Rose (although she believes she is paying a hired female nurse to care for her). Thus, the
biblical picture of woman as man’s helper is turned on its head— another example of
Schreiner’s inability to wrest herself free from the polarized dualisms perpetuated by
biblical texts like the Genesis story and, by extension, the colonial culture at large.
Finally, the very dichotomy between God’s justice (requiring death) and mercy
(offering eternal life) that predominated in both Part One and “Times and Seasons”
continues to haunt the characters (and, by extension, the reader) in Part Two. This is
especially evident in Waldo’s reaction to Gregory Rose’s recounting o f the story of
Lyndall’s death. After discovering that Lyndall (whom he has loved his entire life) has
died, Waldo awakens from a dream in which he imagined her still alive and in love with
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him and, gripped with grief, flings the door open to look at the stars (in which, said Otto
in Part One, the “souls we loved lived” [55]). Longing for Lyndall to be alive
somewhere, he searches the stars’ “solitary grandeur” (286)--only to “shudder,. . . at last
turnfing] away from them in horror. Such countless multitudes . . . and yet not in one of
them all was she! . . r. Year after year, century after century, the old changes o f nature
would go on . . . but in none of them would she have part!” (286-87). Waldo paces the
room frantically, “pain ma[king] his soul weak; it cried for the old faith” (287). Indeed,
Waldo calls out in desperate prayer, “Oh, God! God! for a Hereafter!” (287). W aldo’s
longing for the “old faith”— and his (and the reader’s) knowledge that it cannot be
recovered because o f Waldo’s/Schreiner’s failure to reconcile the ideas of divine justice
and mercy— render this passage one o f the most despairing in the novel’s second half.
The “old God” o f sovereign wrath also continues to make itself felt in the second
half through the actions and beliefs o f the matriarch Tant Sannie, who is depicted as too
foolish even to raise the religious questions concerning God’s justice and mercy that
torment Waldo throughout the novel. Indeed, in the final chapter it is obvious that Tant
Sannnie assumes the concept o f a deity who is sovereign over, and wrathful toward,
human affairs to be the correct one—be it in her views on human procreation (“If a
woman’s old enough to marry, and doesn’t, she’s sinning against the Lord .. . What, does
she think the Lord took all that trouble in making her for nothing? It’s evident He wants
babies, otherwise why does He send them?” [293]) and on nineteenth-century scientific
progress:
It’s with all these new inventions that the wrath o f God must fall on us. What
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were the children of Israel punished for, if it wasn’t for making a golden calf? . ..
Let them make their steam-waggons and their fire-carriages; let them go on as
though the dear Lord didn’t know what he was about when He gave horses and
oxen legs,— the destruction of the Lord will follow them. I don’t know how such
people read their Bibles. When do we hear of Moses or Noah riding in a railway?
(294)
Tant Sannie’s reflections thus ironically hearken back to the beginning o f the novel (and
o f “Times and Seasons”), as they recall and echo Waldo’s Old Testament God o f wrath.
The opposition between justice versus mercy remains ironically, parodically, present at
the end o f a novel from which it cannot be eliminated, try as the author might to do so.
Finally, Tant Sannie’s disparaging commentary on the modem creations o f the
late nineteenth-century (“steam-waggons” and “fire-carriages”) is also an example o f the
various ways in which Schreiner disparages the act o f creation in Part Two. Indeed, in
the second half o f the novel creation itself becomes an almost grotesque undertaking:
W aldo’s carving (which it took him “nine months” to produce [158]) is described as
depicting a “grotesque little mannikin at the bottom” (159), its portrayal o f “men and
birds . . . almost grotesque in their laboured resemblance to nature, [bearing] signs o f
patient thought” (157);28 and, in a speech that eerily foreshadows the death o f Lyndall’s
“creation,” her newborn child, Lyndall states,
I would not like to bring a soul into this world. When it sinned and when it
suffered, something like a dead hand would fall on me [ironically, it is Lyndall’s
hand that closes over the cold feet o f her dying child (278)]-‘You did it, you, for
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your own pleasure you created this thing! See your work! ’ . . .

A parent is only

like to God: if his work turns out bad so much the worse for him; he dare not
wash his hands o f it. (209)
The repeated failure to create anew in Part Two of the novel locates us at the problematic
site of the “post”--the space after the attempted “new creation,” in which the old
uncannily repeats itself in different contexts. As I have argued, Schreiner’s “post”
Genesis narrative is ultimately not “post” anything, but remains firmly ensconced within
the original binary discourse it trys to undermine; it cannot, as it were, wash its hands of
creation and the stories that attach to it. But this is not to say that the work has “turned
out bad” and that we should wash our hands o f it. In its ambivalent inclusion o f and
working through o f colonial discourse (via its adoption of the binary structures that are
basic, for instance, to the Genesis story), as well as in its repeated if “failed” attempt to
envision a post-colonial world (from which those structures would be eradicated), Story is
an exemplary postcolonial text. Indeed, its very genius lies in this problematic mixture o f
the old worlds it repeats and the new worlds o f which it dreams.

CONCLUSION: “THE MARK OF THE OLD WOUND”

He touched the dying animal light at last as it ran past him and it turned its head
around towards him, a little startled by his alien fingers and hand, remembering
something forgotten. The alert dreaming skin—radiant with spiritual fear and
ecstasy— quivered and vibrated like the strings o f a harp where the mark o f the old
wound was and it tossed the memory o f the spear on its head, trying to recall the
miracle o f substance and flesh. It stood thus— with the carpenter’s hand upon
it—with a curious abstract and wooden memory of its life and its death. The
sense o f death was a wooden dream, a dream of music in the sculptured ballet of
the leaves and the seasons, the shavings on the ground from the carpenter’s saw
and chisel.
Wilson Harris, Palace of the Peacock

To return, finally, to a comparison of Schreiner’s Story and Harris’s Palace of the
Peacock, one cannot help but note the disparity in the moods o f their respective endings.
Why, when both authors reinscribe the Genesis story, “miscegenating” or “creolizing”
their texts in order to rewrite the central biblical text o f Empire, does one tale end in
religious despair and, ultimately, nihilism (even Schreiner’s concept o f the “Universal
Unity,” in which the souls of the departed supposedly partake, is characterized at the end
61
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o f the novel as a “dream and phantom” [290-91]), the other in a vision o f rebirth and
regeneration, an almost religious hope? For, indeed, Story ends in W aldo’s solitary
death, after he learns he will never “possess” Lyndall as his own, with only a few
disinterested chickens looking on; Palace ends in the symbolic rebirth o f the already twice
dead crew members, each o f them holding “at last in his arms what he had been for ever
seeking and what he had eternally possessed” fPalace 117). Is this difference in mood
and outcome merely a function o f their differing historical moments? That is to say, was
Harris’s ability to re-vision the colonial experience, its discourse and its narratives, in a
more positive way due only to the fact that he lived and wrote at a time of
decolonization? That he lived and wrote at a time when the deconstruction o f binary
oppositions was becoming more conceivable (as the ascension of
postmodern/poststructuralist thinking would suggest)?
While both these arguments are salient, I would like to nuance them by
suggesting, in conclusion, that Harris “succeeds” where Schreiner “fails” because, in
Palace, he pursues a vision o f the biblical account of Christ’s death on the cross as
effecting a reconciliation between God’s justice and mercy, thereby coming to terms with
the very dichotomy, as I have argued, that stymied Schreiner’s attempt to “write out o f ’
the binary colonial discourse o f her day. A brief look at two remarkably similar chapters
in both novels— “Waldo’s Stranger” in Schreiner’s Story, and the final section of Palace.
“Paling of Ancestors”— will elucidate what I will argue is the central cause of the novels’
widely divergent endings: namely, their contrasting readings o f the Bible itself.
The chapter entitled “W aldo’s Stranger” immediately follows the “Times and
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Seasons” chapter, and opens at the same moment as does “Times and Seasons” : “Waldo
lay on his stomach on the red sand” (137; 155). Indeed, the seven stages o f “Times and
Seasons” have been an interruption of the sequential narrative initiated in Part One, which
is now taken up again in “Waldo’s Stranger.” The chapter, like “Times and Seasons,” is
also allegorical (and is more obviously so, one might add). However, in contrast to the
previous allegory, which “failed” to mimic its biblical model, the so-called “Allegory of
the Hunter” in “Waldo’s Stranger” does not attempt to mimic another text at all, but is a
self-consciously original allegory in its own right.29 Moreover, theologically speaking, it
begins where “Times and Seasons” ended—that is, at the place where God has been
replaced by Nature, the Bible by Science. The allegory is related by a stranger who stops
to rest at the farm, and who (in contrast to St. Paul’s vision o f charity as outlined in 1
Corinthians 13:7) “believes nothing, hopes nothing, fears nothing, feels nothing”
(159)— an indication o f the direction his allegory will take. As he examines W aldo’s
carving, his “wooden post,” the stranger allegorizes the meaning of the “grotesque
figures” carved thereupon as the story o f a hunter who one day catches a glimpse o f a
“vast white bird .. . sailing in the everlasting blue” (160); Wisdom later tells the Hunter
chat what he has seen is the White Bird o f Truth (160). The Hunter becomes obsessed
with capturing her, and spends his life hoping to possess what Wisdom tells him he will
“never see, never hold .. . Nothing but Truth can hold Truth” (162). As he travels, the
Hunter must abandon comforting beliefs (i.e., the birds, “fed on the grains o f credulity,”
that cry “a human-God!” “Immortality!” and “Reward after Death!” [161]), wander alone
into the land o f Absolute Negation and Denial (where the “merry wisp lights” o f
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Sensuality tempt him), resist the lures of the lands o f Superstition and Despair, and,
finally, encounter the “mighty mountains of Dry-facts and Realities” (166).
It is upon these mountains that the Hunter begins to scale a “mighty wall o f rock,
smooth and without break, stretching as far as the eye could see” (166). The Hunter
grows old and weary as he spends the rest o f his life hewing stairs and carving footholds
in the rock; until he can work no more and lies down to die with the “comfort” that by the
steps he has carved other men will ascend: “by the stairs I have cut they will climb . . . At
the clumsy work they will laugh; when the stones roll they will curse me. But they will
mount, and on my work” (168). It is only now, with the “mist of death in his eyes,” that
the Bird o f Truth flies overhead, dropping a single feather onto the dying Hunter’s breast
(168). After a lifetime pursuit of Truth, the Hunter learns that She is actually unknowable
to the individual. The only “knowledge” he can hold onto is that others (who will “never
know the name” of the one who went before [168]) will use his work to come closer to
capturing Truth, and that, as Wisdom had earlier counseled, when “enough o f those silver
feathers shall have been gathered by the hands o f men, and . . . woven into a cord, and the
cord into a net, that in that net Truth may be captured” (162). Moreover, it is only the
scientist—the one who actually resists the lures of religion and sensuality to begin
tackling stern reality— who can contribute to the formation of this net (though the
suggestion seems to be that the quest to form this net will be interminable, as the
mountains at last visible at the apex o f the Hunter’s climb/lifetime rise “etemal[ly]” into
the clouds [168]).
In essence, then, the allegory of the Hunter and the Genesis allegory in “Times

and Seasons” can be read as counterparts: “Times and Seasons” writes through the
biblical text to arrive at a complete rejection of the Bible and its dichotomies in favor o f
Science; the allegory o f the Hunter solidifies this rejection and goes further to expose
even Science as next to futile in revealing ultimate “Truth” (reinforced by the Stranger’s
musing, as he watches Waldo’s passionate reaction to both the allegory and the book by
Herbert Spencer that he gives to Waldo: “Poor devil! . . . He smiled, and then sighed
wearily, very wearily” [173]). The chapter ends with a sentence that recalls the images o f
sunshine in stage four o f “Times and Seasons (which for the child inspired thoughts of
hell and damnation): “There was a rare beauty to him in the sunshine that evening”
(173). On first reading this chapter-ending seems to offer a moment of unadulterated
optimism, but upon finishing the novel one realizes that it is actually steeped in irony,
because it foreshadows Waldo’s death “in the yellow sunshine,” on a “sunshiny
afternoon,” in the midst o f a “sunshiny dream” (300). W aldo’s sense o f the “rare beauty”
in the sunshine, like Schreiner’s sense o f the “throb o f Universal Life” underlying all
things (290), is thus at the end o f the novel exposed as a “dream and phantom” (291);
indeed, the only “reality” left at the end of Story is the very failure o f stories, whether
those of the Bible or o f Science, to counter the nihilism o f existence.
While both the allegory o f the Hunter and Story as a whole end upon a nihilistic
note, Harris’s “Paling o f Ancestors”— a similar recounting o f one man’s pursuit o f truth
up the face o f a cliff in which he must hew his own footholds— begins at this nihilistic
juncture, and moves, unlike Schreiner’s narrative, from despair to religious hope. After
five days pursuing the runaway “folk” upriver, Donne (along with Jennings and daSilva,
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the only two o f his river crew left alive) has reached the “wall and cliff o f heaven,” which
he must scale in order to discover (and re-cover) the beginning, the “indestructible
nucleus and redemption of creation” (Palace 101). As mentioned above, the journey is,
up until this point, a reverse parallel movement through the seven days o f creation as
outlined in Genesis One. However, as Donne reaches this fifth day, he, like Schreiner’s
soul in stage five, recognizes the need for a departure. He has lost most o f his crew, the
“old Arawak woman” (their guide) has disappeared (99), and, in a moment o f self
reflection, he recognizes the “horror and hell” (101) of his harsh rule o f the Guyanese
aboriginals:
And a wave o f hopelessness enveloped him: everyone in the vessel was
crumbling into a door into the sun through which one perceived nothing
standing—the mirror o f absolute nothingness. An abstraction grew around
him—nothing else—the ruling abstraction of himself which he saw reflected
nowhere. He was a ruler o f men and a ruler o f nothing. (99)
Donne here admits that he cannot return home to his former life as master over slaves;
that to “return to a ruling function o f nothingness and to a false sense o f home was the
meaning of hell” (99). As he gazes up the “steep spirit o f the c liff’ that he knows he must
climb, Donne acknowledges the need for a new beginning; he longs for the universal
truth, the “atom, the very nail o f moment in the universe” (101).
Harris’s use o f the word “nail” to characterize the supreme “moment” o f meaning
and truth points toward what will clearly become, for Donne, the “abstract image and
correspondence, in which all things and events gained their substance and universal
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meaning” (101): the nailing of Christ upon the cross. Even the above phrase, which
encapsulates Donne’s desire to find absolute meaning, rings with the cadence o f Acts
17:28, where St. Paul speaks to the men of Athens and states, “For in [Christ] we live,
and move, and have our being.” The desire to return to the beginning o f creation and
thereby to locate the “abstract image” in which “all things [gain] their substance and
universal meaning” also hearkens to St. Paul’s letter to the Colossians, where he argues
that Christ himself was “before” creation:
[Christ] is the image o f the invisible God, the firstborn o f every creature: For by
him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth . . . all things
were created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all
things consist. (Col. 1:15-17)
The above passage o f scripture goes on to describe God’s reconciliation o f his fallen
creation to himself, which Paul saw as effected through Christ’s death on the cross: “For
it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; And, having made peace
through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto him self’ (Col. 1:19-20).
What becomes more and more evident as Donne progresses up the cliff is the
image o f Christ’s sacrifice upon the cross, and the synthesis o f God’s justice and mercy
that death accomplished (see, among others, Romans 3:25, where Christ’s death is
described as the “propitiation” for the sin o f humankind—that is, God’s mercy given
becausehis justice is satisfied; Col. 2:14, where Paul notes that the “handwriting o f
ordinances that was against us” [i.e., the old law] was “[taken] out of the way, nail[ed] to
the cross; and Eph. 2:15-16, where Paul, writing to the Gentiles in Ephesus, describes the
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synthesis o f Old and New, Jew and Gentile, effected in the cross [“having abolished in his
flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in the ordinances; for to make
in him self of twain one new man, so making peace; And that he might reconcile both
unto God in one body by the cross”]). Donne’s climb becomes a visionary sequence, in
which he sees various figures in the side of the cliff (almost as if he is looking through a
window). The first figure he sees is a “young carpenter,” the “craftsman of God,” who is
hewing out of the “cedar of Lebanon” a rectangular face with hair that “parted itself in the
middle and fell on both sides o f his face into a harvest. . . Every movement and glance
and expression was . .. the divine alienation and translation o f flesh and blood into
everything and anything on earth” (102). The allusions to Christ, while not in any way
exactly parallel to biblical narrative (as is fitting, given the “creolized” nature o f Harris’s
text), are obvious: the Jesus o f the Bible was a carpenter (Mark 6:3); traditional exegesis
holds that Christ himself was the “cedar of Lebanon” spoken of in the Old Testament
(Psalm 92:12); the “translation o f flesh and blood” into “everything and anything on
earth” is almost a reverse incarnation (in which, according to scripture, spirit became
flesh and blood); or the “translation” could be read as what Christ accomplished on the
cross, i.e. the “translation” o f his flesh and blood into ah atoning sacrifice for the sins of
humankind. These references, coupled with the recurring image o f a swallow
(traditionally, a symbol o f the Resurrection) that flits “in and out o f the room” and is
reflected in the “dark eyes” o f the carpenter (102), suggest the biblical Christ figure.
The rest o f the narrative continues to solidify this reading, as Donne, knowing the
“chisel and the saw in the room had touched him and done something . .. to make him
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anew” (102), begins to hammer on the wall of the cliff to attract the carpenter’s attention.
The carpenter turns his gaze upon Donne, who then sees the “image of Death in the
carpenter” (103) and, immediately after this vision, sees a homed animal “bounding
towards him through the prehistoric hole in the c liff. . . It had a wound in its side from a
spear” (103). Again, these images allude to Christ’s death on the cross, where according
to scripture “one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side” (Jn. 19:34). Moreover, in
the Old Testament, homed animals— specifically “bulls”—were to be used as sin
offerings for the Israelites (see Lev. 4:1-5:13; 6:24-30; 8:14-17; 16:3-22); in the New
Testament, according to Hebrews 10:1-18, Christ takes the place o f homed animals such
as bulls and goats as a perfect and final “sin offering” for all o f humankind— an apt
example o f the synthesis (“creolization”) of Old Testament justice (requiring constant
atonement for sin via animal sacrifice, the animals “standing in the place o f ’ the people)
and New Testament mercy (Christ’s death finished the “work” o f animal sacrifice, as both
a person [not an animal] standing in the place of other people, and, according to scripture,
as a perfect representative o f persons standing in the place of other persons [Eph. 2:14ff]).
Finally, as the homed animal dies, the room becomes illuminated with the “richest
impressions o f eternity,” perhaps signaling the fact that, according to scripture, Christ’s
death made “eternal life” available to all humankind (cf. Mk. 10:30; Mt. 25:46; Jn. 3:16,
10:28,17:2; Rom. 6:23; 1 Tim. 6:12; et. al.).
It is also at this point that another “death” occurs when Jennings “slipp[ed]
suddenly in the dark upon a step in the cliff’ (105). Now, as the narrator tells us, only
Donne and daSilva are left to wonder “whose turn would be next to fall from the sky as
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the last ghost o f the crew had died and they alone were left to frame Christ’s tree and
home” (106), yet another reference to the cross. As they continue climbing upward,
Donne and daSilva “c[o]me upon another window in the wall” (106), this one containing
a different image o f the biblical Christ—the infant Jesus and the Madonna (note the
reversal o f biblical narrative order: i.e., Christ’s death is depicted before his birth).
Donne, filled with longing and feeling a “glowing intimacy,” looks into the room and sees
that it is “Bare, unfurnished, save for a crib in a stall that might have been an animal’s
trough” (106), alluding to the manger into which Mary placed the infant Christ (Lk.
2:7; 12; 16). He also sees a woman with a “child [who] also stood at her feet” (Palace
106), images which are “drawn with such slenderness and everlasting impulse one knew
it was richer than all the images o f seduction combined to the treasuries of the east”
(107). The very epigraph to”Paling o f Ancestors,” an excerpt from Gerard Manley
Hopkins’s poem “The Starlight Night,” foreshadows the image of the Christ and
Madonna Donne encounters: “This piece-bright paling shuts the spouse / Christ home,
Christ and his mother and all his hallows.” Indeed, it seems here that Donne himself is
gazing through the “piece-bright paling” upon the image o f “Christ and his mother.”
As Donne watches mother and child, he suddenly loses the physical sense of sight,
becoming “truly blind at last,” as he also recognizes his own worthlessness, noting “. . .
the unflinching clarity with which he looked into himself and saw that all his life he had
loved no one but him self. . . It was his blindness that made him see his own nothingness”
(108). This is yet another (ironically inverted) reference to scripture, in which
“blindness” is equated with spiritual unbelief, “sight” with spiritual understanding (Mt.

23:16ff, where Jesus continually calls the unbelieving Pharisees “blind;” see also Jn.
9:40; 2 Cor. 3:14; 2 Pet. 1:9). Here, Donne’s apex o f spiritual understanding (“as one
looking into the void o f oneself upon the far greater love . . . that has made the universe”
[107]) occurs simultaneously with the realization of his blindness.
It is Donne’s physical blindness that finally leads to his death as well, as he and
daSilva can no longer climb and reach the point of exhaustion and fall from the cliff on
“the dawn o f the sixth day of creation” (108; again, note the inversion o f biblical
narrative; humans are created on the sixth day in Genesis; here, Donne and daSilva die,
but are symbolically re-created on the seventh day, as discussed below). In death they
reach the ultimate destination for which the novella is named: the “Palace of the
Peacock,” which manifests itself as the image o f the longed-for “atom,” the “nail o f the
moment in the universe.” Here the Palace, the culmination of Donne’s symbolic journey
and quest for truth, is pictured as merging the Old Testament tree that brought death and
damnation (the Tree o f Knowledge) with the New Testament tree that brought life and
salvation (the cross of Christ):
I saw the tree in the distance wave its arms and walk when I looked at it through
the spiritual eye o f my s o u l . . . The bark and wood turned to lightning flesh and
the sun which had been suspended from its head rippled and broke into stars that
stood where the shattered leaves had been . . . The stars became peacock’s eyes,
and the great tree o f flesh and blood swirled into another stream that sparkled with
divine feathers where the neck and the hands and the feet had been nailed. (112)
Perhaps this vision is what has allowed Harris to assert that, even in the face o f
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postmodernist scepticism, “one can have a religious hope,” as his reading o f the cross as
effecting reconciliation between Old and New, justice and mercy, seems to point toward a
more “creolized” understanding o f the Bible as a whole than did Schreiner’s— an
understanding that allows him to overcome the “sense of death” with which Schreiner’s
' novel concludes, to re-vision this death as a “wooden dream.” At the end o f Harris’s
novel, this dream of death makes way for the beginning of a new life o f “fulfilment and
understanding”-—the new life that ushers forth, startlingly, paradoxically, from “the mark
o f the old wound” (104).

*

3|C

*

As I have attempted to show in this conclusion, the construction o f Harris’s
“palace,” and o f his Palace as a whole, is deeply indebted to a religious vision that
understands and takes into account the synthesizing work of the cross. While more than
plausible, this conclusion itself needs to be supplemented by one last, cautionary note:
when positing any interpretation o f Harris’s work, we must always take care to keep in
mind that according any “one” meaning to Harris’s texts flies in the face o f his fictional
project, and for this reason the undeniable presence of Christological symbolism at the
end o f the novel should be read as only one hermeneutic key among many, opening the
door to only one o f many possible interpretations o f Palace. As I noted in Part One o f
this thesis, Harris’s aesthetic program is a field of experiment in which nothing is ever
finished; it is a “beginning” that is constantly in a state of revision (an “unfinished

Genesis,” to use Harris’s own term for it). Indeed, Harris’s work so vehemently resists
singular interpretation that one might just as easily construct an argument that Palace
recounts a journey through the illusions o f conventional religious faith into a new
spiritual vision that both eradicates and includes those former “illusions” (for the “many
rooms o f the palace where [Donne and the crew] stood” [recalling John 14:2, “In my
Father’s house are many mansions”] are “free from the chains of illusion we had made
without” [Palace 116]). Perhaps it is, finally, the very fact of this resistance to singular
interpretation that allows Harris to image truth as a brilliantly plumed tail o f feathers, so
much more diverse and substantial than the solitary feather that drops onto the chest o f
the exhausted hunter from the elusive “vast white bird of truth” that Schreiner’s Waldo
spends his life hunting after: “It was a feather. He died holding it” (Story 169).

NOTES

1. A rif Dirlik, Anne McClintock, and Stuart Hail have all noted the "academic
marketability" (McClintock, quoted in Hall 243) of the term "post-colonial" in American
academia today. Dirlik says the post-colonial is "a post-structuralist, post-foundationalist
discourse, deployed mainly by displaced Third World intellectuals making good in
prestige Ivy League American Universities and deploying the fashionable language of the
linguistic and cultural "turn’ to ‘rephrase’ Marxism, returning it ‘to another First World
language with universalistic epistemological pretensions’" (quoted in Hall 243).

2. There is currently no published critical study that has read the "Times and Seasons"
chapter in Story as an allegory o f the seven days of creation in Genesis One. The present
study aims not only to argue for this reading, but to posit, further, that the allegory’s very
"failure" (its parodicity, to use a term I introduce later) helps situate the novel squarely
within the body of postcolonial literature.

3. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are taken from the King James Version of
the Bible.

4. Berkman notes that Schreiner "may have taken this image from Darwin's Origin of
Species, where the tree o f life . . . appears in an extended metaphor" (Berkman 268).
However, she fails to mention the biblical source in Genesis 3:22: "And the Lord God
said, ‘The man has now become like one o f us, knowing good and evil. He must not be
allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever.'"

5. Schreiner’s religious upbringing was anything but homogeneous. Rather, the
particular brand of Christianity she rejected was actually a mixture o f several conflicting
religious sects. On the one hand, her mother’s family were originally Wesleyan
Methodists, but eventually followed George Whitefield (evangelist of the first Great
Awakening) in his acceptance o f the Calvinist doctrine of the predestination o f the elect.
Her mother Rebecca was strict, puritanical, and "considered childhood submission to
adults and older siblings the moral correlative to human submission to God, female to
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male, and blacks to whites" (Avrech-Berkman 16). Her mother also, according to
Schreiner, frequently exploited religious terror in her methods of child rearing (17). Her
father, Gottlob Schreiner, on the other hand, was a Wesleyan (Methodist), and therefore
Arminian in his thinking (everyone has a chance for salvation, not just the elect;
moreover, humans play a part in their own salvation in that they have the "free will" to
either accept or reject God’s grace). According to Schreiner, he was "infinitely tenderer
to us as children and had a much greater heart than my mother" (quoted in First and Scott
47). Her parents’ divergent theologies, and consequent attitudes and actions toward
others, thus typified the justice/mercy dichotomy with which Schreiner wrestled, and
more than likely abetted her eventual disillusionment with and rejection o f the Christian
faith.

6. Cf. Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manicheans (De Genesi contra Manichaeos),
Books 1-5, in which Augustine reads Genesis One allegorically as both a history of
humankind from Adam to the end of the world and as an allegory o f a single human life
from birth to death; "Caedmon’s Hymn," the earliest extant poem in English; M ilton’s
Paradise Lost: and Jacques’ speech on the Ages of Man in Shakespeare’s As You Like It.

7. Homi Bhabha has pointed out that reading colonial texts as uniformly
socially/historically mimetic merely "foster[s] their reabsorption into an English tradition,
domesticating their radicalism by ignoring the important colonial disruptions to the
'English' suface of the text" (Ashcroft 34; see Bhabha, "Representation"). The present
study focuses on one such "disruption:" that is, "undomesticated" postcolonial parodies
o f the Genesis creation account.

8. Earlier critics have almost without exception dismissed Story as haphazard and
lacking in structural unity. Elaine Showalter asserts that Schreiner had "no idea how to
construct a novel" (Showalter, Review 106) and that "the labors o f construction and
plotting were beyond her" (Literature 198); Vineta Colby finds "glaring flaws" in Story
(Colby 62); Richard Rive flatly states that "the loose manner in which [Schreiner] puts
down her thoughts, regardless o f the principal theme o f the book, often detracts from the
aesthetic value o f her novels" (Rive 240); and Uys Krige describes certain allegorical
passages in Story as "sticking out from the rest of the book like the exposed scaffolding
o f an uncompleted building" (Krige 7). Recent years, by contrast, have marked a drastic
shift in how Story’s idiosyncrasies are read: see Gerald Monsman, 50-51; and Rachel
Blau Duplessis, 21. For the favorable opinions of other South African writers, see Doris
Lessing, 97-129; Nadine Gordimer, 20-21; and Stephen Gray, 143. For a recent general
introduction to her life and work, see Clayton.

9. Indeed, as the authors o f The Empire Writes Back suggest, recognizing that the
metropolitan center itself is only a linguistic/cultural construct can have a liberating effect
for postcolonial writers. When the powerless move beyond the assumption that "words
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are the signifiers o f a pre-given reality, a reality and a truth which is only located at the
centre" (Ashcroft 89), and recognize the extent to which the imperial center is a purely
linguistic/cultural construct, the center of order becomes "the ultimate disorder. This
perception is both the ultimate rebellion and the ultimate unveiling performed by post
colonial literature. There is no centre o f reality just as there is no pre-given unmediated
reality. If language constructs the world then the margins are the centre and may
reconstruct it according to a different pattern of conventions, expectations, and
experiences" (90-91).

10. Superimpositions o f this sort are at the heart o f what critics have identified as the
essentially allegorical nature o f colonial discourse—its inability to start anew, its
insistence (from Columbus’s first acts o f naming onward) on "read[ing] the territory o f
the other by reference to an anterior set o f signs already situated in a cultural thematics,"
thereby making the "new world . . . contingent upon the old" (Slemon 161).

11. Hutcheon notes that the OED definition of parody as a "ridiculing imitation" derives
from the etymological assumption that the only correct translation o f the Greek "parodia"
is "counter-song." She goes on to argue that the root "para" can also be translated
"beside," therefore suggesting an "accord or intimacy rather than a contrast" (32).

12. See notes 17 and 18 on E. K. Brathwaite, below, for a discussion o f this
simultaneous movement into both past and future in Caribbean literature.

13. For a detailed account o f Schreiner’s representations of blacks, see Raiskin, 79-94.

14. The phrase "the second death" alludes to Revelation 20:14: "Then death and Hades
were thrown into the lake o f fire. The lake o f fire is the second death." Ironically, Harris
evokes this biblical image of the end o f all things to title the chapter that initiates a
journey in which Donne and his river crew will, in effect, reach the "beginning" o f all
things as their journey culminates at the Palace o f the Peacock, where the narrator sees the
faces o f all the crew members who died during the journey. The biblical "second death,"
then, in Harris’s fiction, is re-visioned as a second life—another example of postcolonial
appropriation o f the Judeo-Christian traditions imported by the British Empire.

15. See Sandra Drake 67; Michael Gilkes, Wilson Harris 24; Hena Maes-Jelinek, Naked
Design 56. Barbara Webb is the only critic who has explicitly stated that the seven-day
journey in Palace is "a paradoxical reversal o f the seven days o f creation" (77); however,
she fails to support this contention with any kind o f textual reference or demonstration.
Jean-Pierre Durix convincingly argues that the seven-day period of "stripping" in The
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Secret Ladder is a "genesis in reverse" (34), but does not extend his argument to Palace.
Hena Maes-Jelinek's The Naked Design shows how Palace is an "architectural, dynamic
revision and reconstitution of the past" (19) and argues that "creation involves
destruction, the breaking down of what would otherwise be a rigid construction" (43), but
never traces this "breaking down" through the seven-day biblical account. Certainly a
developed reading o f Donne's river journey as (re)mapping the biblical Genesis in reverse
is highly overdue.

16. O f course, in offering this particular reading I am aware that it is (and should be)
only one o f a myriad number of possible interpretations. To argue for any "final" reading
o f Harris's work would be to contradict the aesthetic grounds upon which he builds (and
upon which I have built my argument in this essay), as it would relegate the critic to the
realm o f Manichean dualisms and hierarchical structure from which Harris's fiction
strives to break free. His method o f accomplishing this through the marriage of
contraries ("creolization") is discussed below. For a related, but decidedly more
straightforward, Latin American "reversal" of the Genesis narrative, see Alejo
Carpentier’s The Lost Steps (1953).

17. In removing the final "e" from "name" to coin a term that designates an "original"
identity, Brathwaite acknowledges that one's journey into the past cannot reveal an
authentic identity, but only a "reduction o f the original, its translation into something
other than what it once was" (Bongie 57)--that is, one's original "name" transformed by
the effects o f creolization. In this sense the journey backward (toward one's "name") will
inevitably and simultaneously be a movement forward (as one's modem vantage point
reveals that "name" has become "nam," thus pointing to a present and future "creolized"
identity). One's "nam," then, is paradoxically both aboriginal and aboriginal.

18. Brathwaite travels into the past to recover an ancestral "nam," and aboriginal
essence, which he sees as authentic; Harris travels backward toward a "nam(e)less and
therefore (in Harris's terms) more authentic dimension o f being" (Maes-Jelinek, Naked
Design 10). Furthermore, Brathwaite claims time and space must be hierarchically
reversed in a post-colonial context; Harris claims that "space 'annihilates' time as it
establishes itself as the primary category, the 'womb' o f space from which and to which
temporal structures and constructions arise and return" (Griffiths, "Post-Colonial Space
and Time," 67). Griffiths argues in favor o f a "more integrative account of post-colonial
critical positions in the Caribbean which will acknowledge both the powerful differences
and the great similarities o f the two main streams o f critical thought that I have
represented by the work of Brathwaite and Harris" (69). My own analysis supports this
integrative account by emphasizing their shared recognition o f creolization as the
potential catalyst o f "new world order."
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19. William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell." Harris said in a 1979 interview
that he has "always greatly and spontaneously admired from my youth English poetry
. such as the works by [among others] Blake" (quoted in Fabre 47). For comparisons of
Harris with Blake, see Louis James 39; and Michael Gilkes, Wilson Harris 3.

20. Harris has called himself a "kind of Christian Gnostic . . . Not Gnostic in the extreme
sense in which the Cathars were Gnostics. They said that the Creation was the work o f a
demiurge. I can't accept that" (quoted in Riach 56).

21. See Hena Maes-Jelinek, "Myth"; Sandra Drake, chapter one; and Antonio BenitezRojo, chapter five. The myth of El Dorado itself has become a spiritual trope; as Harris
notes in "Tradition and the West Indian Novel," the El Dorado myth "has begun to
acquire a residual pattern o f illuminating correspondences. El Dorado, City o f Gold, City
o f God" (Harris, Tradition 35).
22. Waldo has, even here, conflated the two New Testament recordings o f Christ’s
"mustard seed" teachings on faith; in Luke 17:6, Christ is recorded as saying "If you have
faith as small as a mustard seed, you can say to this mulberry tree, ‘Be uprooted and
planted in the sea,’ and it will obey you." The error could have been unintentional; or it
could have been intentional, pointing forward to Waldo’s "mockingly strange, trivial
questions" about the veracity of the Bible and the disparities in the synoptic gospels:
"Why did the women in Mark see only one angel and the women in Luke two? Could a
story be told in opposite ways and both ways be true? Could it?" (Story 67).

23. Although it is doubtful that Schreiner would have read Augustine’s On Genesis
Against the Manicheans at the time she wrote Story (in her early 20's), it is interesting to
note that Augustine, too, equates Day One o f creation with the period o f infancy, and Day
Two with childhood (although Schreiner’s childhood occupies both stage two and three
in her narrative).

24. According to Genesis 1:2, water existed before the creation of the universe: "And
the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And
the Spirit o f God moved upon the face of the waters."

25. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12: "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to
face: now I know in part; but then I shall know even as also I am known." (Jeremy
Taylor, by the way, was a seventeenth-century clergyman whose writings greatly
influenced John Wesley, the founder o f Methodism.)
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26. Augustine offers a fascinating interpretation of how the seventh day encompasses the
former six. He argues that God created only one day, which recurred seven times: " . . .
it is not clear when God created the seventh day, which is called the Sabbath. For on that
day He made nothing; indeed, on that seventh day He rested from what He had made on
the six days. How, then, did He rest on a day He did not create? . . . Perhaps we should
say that God created only one day, so that by its recurrence many periods called days
would pass by. It was not necessary, then, for Him to create the seventh day, for the
seventh recurrence o f the day God had created made it [i.e., the "seventh day" in Genesis
2]" (Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manicheans, Book Four, Chapter 20).

27. In reading the creation o f Adam and Eve concomitantly with the Genesis One
narrative, I am following the exegetical tradition that reads the two narratives together:
that is, that reads Genesis 2:7-25 as simply a more detailed account of what is going on in
Genesis 1:27.

28. Waldo’s "grotesque" attempt to create something new (a carving) out of something
old (the figures o f the men and birds he sees everywhere around him) can be read as yet
another mise-en-abime ofSchreiner’s "failed" allegory in "Times and Seasons."

29. Schreiner considered the "Allegory of the Hunter" to be her finest work, and later
excerpted it for publication on its own as simply "The Hunter" (Avrech-Berkman 50). So
moved by the allegory was the influential nineteenth-century philosopher Herbert
Spencer that he requested it be read to him on his deathbed (51).
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